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TRANSCENDING THE CRIMINAL LAW’S “ONE SIZE
FITS ALL” RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

HANNAH BRENNER*
ABSTRACT
Domestic violence is no longer a private matter confined within
the four walls of the home. The shift from private to public is connected with marked progress within the legal system, which strives
to protect victims and hold batterers accountable through a myriad
of specific responses that have ranged from attitudinal and logistical shifts from law enforcement to increased attention within legal
education to a general acknowledgment of the impact of domestic
violence on individual victims, children, families, and the broader
community to the passage of federal and state legislation.
The state legislative landscape has historically centered around
a very narrow subset of laws that mandate or encourage arrest and
criminalize domestic violence-related acts. Research demonstrates
both compelling support for and against the effectiveness of these
laws, making it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about their
actual impact. Scholars and advocates have also expressed diverging
opinions about the desirability of this response.
This article takes a different approach to exploring the criminalization of domestic violence by transcending the pervasive either/or
dichotomy that dominates the field. It builds on my previous body
of work that examines how mandatory arrest laws are often incorrectly categorized into a uniform classification scheme, leading to a
complexity of problems like different research outcomes. Despite the
actual variance in these laws, however, there remains a problematic
uniformity that is characteristic of the current approach: many of
the existing laws, policies, and practices tend to impose a “one size
fits all” solution to a problem that is incredibly complex. The current
singular approach might be necessary as a matter of practicality
and public welfare, but it does not adequately respond to all of a
particular victim’s needs or to the needs of all victims. Many never
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become engaged with the criminal justice system in the first place.
Others, who do, still face tremendous barriers that compromise their
safety and/or impede their ability to leave their abuser. Reconciling
these competing ideas has proved challenging.
Through analysis of recent state-based legislative and policy
innovations focused on two areas that are particularly relevant for
victims—housing and victim safety as it relates to improving the
effectiveness of orders of protection—this article proposes a new conceptual framework. Using these victim-centered state laws and policies as a starting place, this article illustrates how the existence of a
myriad of strategies and innovations can ultimately transcend the
limitations inherent in the existing one size fits all response of the
criminal law.
INTRODUCTION
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
A. The Problem of Domestic Violence
B. Early Origins: The Private Nature of Domestic Violence
II. THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S CURRENT RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
A. State Legislation: Mandatory Arrest and Victim
Protection Orders
B. Federal Legislation: The Violence Against Women Act
C. The Response of Legal Education
III. DIVERGING OPINIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND DYNAMICS
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IV. TRANSCENDING THE CRIMINAL LAW’S “ONE SIZE FITS ALL”
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. Recent Innovations in State Lawmaking & Policies that
Are Responsive to Victims’ Needs
1. State Housing Laws
2. Addressing Victim Safety Through Improving the
Effectiveness of Orders of Protection
a. Electronic Monitoring of Batterers
b. Increased Service of Process
B. The Economics of Domestic Violence Innovations
C. Impact of State-Based Solutions
CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD
INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence no longer exists primarily as a private matter
confined within the four walls of the home. The shift from private
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to public is due in large part to the efforts of battered women’s advocates who fought tirelessly for social and legal recognition of this
problem for victims and society generally.1 In the context of domestic violence as a social movement, progress has been made to protect
victims, hold batterers accountable, and educate the public about
the dynamics and far-reaching consequences of domestic violence.
This progress has manifested in a myriad of specific responses like
state and federal legislation focused on criminal sanctions, attitudinal shifts among law enforcement, and general public acknowledgment of domestic violence’s impact on individual victims, children,
families, and the broader community.
Despite these advances, little has changed in terms of the pervasiveness of the problem. Each year, approximately 1.3 million women
and 835,000 men are assaulted by an intimate partner.2 Research
reveals that at least one in four women will be a victim of domestic
violence,3 and seventy-one percent of Americans personally know
someone who is or has been a victim of domestic violence.4 Though
profound, these statistics do not even begin to capture the stories of
the invisible victims—those whose experiences are never reported—
or the countless children and bystanders who are also harmed,
sometimes less obviously, by witnessing violence perpetrated against
1. I use the terms domestic violence and interpersonal violence (IPV) interchangeably throughout this paper to refer generally to abuse that is perpetrated in the context
of dating, marriage, or other intimate relationships in which two people may or may not
cohabitate. I also consciously use the term “victim” to refer to those individuals who are
harmed by their intimate partners. Although the term is imperfect, it effectively connotes the power imbalance inherent in abusive relationships and also is inclusive, in a
way that the term survivor is not, of those individuals who have been killed at the hands
of their batterer. Further, although I use the pronoun “she” to refer to victims, this is
simply reflective of the reality that most victims are female. See infra note 2. The intention, however, is not to dismiss the reality that there are many male victims of domestic
violence. See infra note 2.
2. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE & CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, NCJ 183781, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN iv (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf. In the year 2000, 1247 women and 440 men were killed by
an intimate partner. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197838, CRIME
DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001, at 1 (2003), available at http://bjs
.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf.
3. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE & CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE 9 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf.
Actual numbers of victims range depending on studies. Generally, women make up about
eighty-five percent of victims of domestic violence, and men account for the remaining
fifteen percent. RENNISON, supra note 2, at 1.
4. ALLSTATE FOUND., THE ALLSTATE FOUNDATION NATIONAL POLL: “CRISIS: ECONOMICS
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE” 5 (2009), available at http://www.clicktoempower.org/media/2038
/executive_summary.pdf.
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a parent or loved one.5 Domestic violence cuts across lines of class,
race, religion, and ethnicity, and it infiltrates both heterosexual and
homosexual relationships alike. It affects men and women of all ages,
ranging from children to the elderly. It also reaches far beyond
tangible, visible, physical harm.6 Domestic violence commands attention from practitioners in fields like medicine, law enforcement,
psychology, social work, and the legal profession, who strive to meet
the needs of victims on an individual level and who also focus their
attention more systemically by providing education and advocating
for legal and policy reform.
The legal system, without question, has played an integral role
in addressing this epidemic and has made important, measurable
progress.7 Law enforcement has refocused priorities and moved beyond a systemic pattern of non-response to domestic violence, and
prosecutors frequently adopt aggressive policies designed to impose
sanctions on batterers. Many law schools offer education in their core
curricula and create specialized domestic violence courses and clinics
to educate future lawyers about the intricacies of the problem and prepare them for issues they may encounter in practice.8 Additionally,
bar associations routinely offer continuing education programs on
5. Studies show that between 3.3 and 10 million children annually witness some sort
of domestic violence. See Bonnie E. Carlson, Children’s Observations of Interparental
Violence, in BATTERED WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES: INTERVENTION STRATEGIES AND
TREATMENT PROGRAMS 145, 160 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1984) (projecting that “at least
3.3 million children yearly are at risk of exposure to parental violence” (emphasis
omitted)); Murray A. Straus, Children as Witnesses to Marital Violence: A Risk Factor
for Lifelong Problems Among a Nationally Representative Sample of American Men and
Women, in CHILDREN AND VIOLENCE 98, 98 (1992), available at http://pubpages.unh.edu
/~mas2/VB48.pdf (estimating ten million child witnesses). Children under the age of
twelve resided in thirty-eight percent of households with domestic violence incidents involving female victims, and in twenty-one percent of households involving male victims
between 2001 and 2005. SHANNAN M. CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 210675,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS 17 (2007),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf.
6. Domestic violence transcends the physical, and can include multiple kinds of abuse.
The Power & Control Wheel, developed by the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project in
Duluth, Minnesota, highlights many of these mechanisms of power, including emotional
and sexual abuse. Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT,
http://www.theduluthmodel.org/pdf/PowerandControl.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
7. For example, the number of battered women who kill their intimate partners each
year has made a significant, marked decline. SHANNAN M. CATALANO ET AL., U.S. DEPT
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228356, SELECTED FINDINGS: FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE 3, 4 (2000),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvv.pdf (finding that between 1993
(the year the National Crime Victim Survey was redesigned) and 2007, the total number
of intimate partner homicides dropped from 3300 to 2340.). Females have consistently
made up about seventy percent of all intimate partner homicide victims. Id. at 3.
8. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TEACH YOUR STUDENTS
WELL: INCORPORATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTO LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: A LAW SCHOOL
REPORT (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol
/teach_students.authcheckdam.pdf.
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domestic violence for practicing lawyers.9 Over time, state legislatures
have crafted legislation that criminalizes domestic violence-related
acts, informed largely by the intersecting goals of punishing batterers,
protecting individual victims, and protecting the public welfare.10
This criminalization of domestic violence has elicited both praise
and criticism, often from those within the same movement. Even empirical research studies demonstrate both compelling support for
and against the effectiveness of criminal laws like mandatory arrest,
making it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions.11 Some scholars
argue that the existing legal framework is inherently problematic.
They suggest it compromises the autonomy and agency of victims of
violence. In other words, by forcing state intervention, a victim has
no right to exercise an opinion about whether arresting the perpetrator is desirable. Some think that the mandatory interventions
further perpetuate the power and control inherent in the battering
relationship, with the state stepping in to wield further control over
the victim.12 Others find that these policies deny victims access to
important material resources.13 The perpetuation of racism is also
frequently cited as a negative consequence of these policies.14
9. Commission on Domestic and Sexual Violence, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www
.americanbar.org/groups/domestic_violence.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) (listing a
number of upcoming events related to domestic violence training).
10. See, e.g., MICH. LEGISLATURE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STALKING, DATE RAPE: AN
INFORMATION AND RESOURCE GUIDE 4–5 (1998), available at http://www.legislature
.mi.gov/documents/publications/DomesticViolence.pdf (outlining several domestic violence laws that Michigan has passed since 1978).
11. See infra Part III.
12. The power and control wielded over victims by their abusers is often replicated
by the influence and rigidness of the state. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated
Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1865
(1996) (“[M]any advocates for battered women argue that the use of state power, such
as subpoenas, has the unintended effect of punishing or ‘revictimizing’ the victim for the
actions of the abuser by forcing the victim into a process over which she has no control.”).
13. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material
Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (2000).
14. Donna Coker writes about the connection between the disproportionately high
rate of arrests and incarceration of African American women due to conspiracy laws,
drug war policies, and disparate criminal penalties, with “[b]attered women . . . are
hesitant to call the police because they are aware that mandatory arrest policies increase
their own chances of arrest . . . .” Donna Coker, Race, Poverty, and the Crime-Centered
Response to Domestic Violence: A Comment on Linda Mills’s Insult to Injury: Rethinking
Our Responses to Intimate Abuse, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1331, 1333 (2004). Other
scholars, like Miriam Ruttenberg, argue that mandatory arrest laws perpetuate racism
because the laws still require a level of police discretion, which historically has meant
higher arrest rates for the black male community. Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist
Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy,
2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 182 (1994); see also SHAMITA DAS DASGUPTA PREPARED BY
PATRICIA ENG, MS. FOUND. FOR WOMEN, SAFETY & JUSTICE FOR ALL: EXAMINING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WOMEN’S ANTI-VIOLENCE MOVEMENT AND THE CRIMINAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 12 (2003), available at http://files.praxisinternational.org/safety_justice.pdf
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Many scholars occupy extreme positions on both sides of the
debate about whether public policy dictates a strong criminal justice
response with a focus on holding batterers accountable at all costs.
Others try to mediate more of a middle ground between these divergent perspectives.15 The competing ideas about the effectiveness,
desirability, and impact of the criminal justice response have formed
the basis of strong disagreement and discourse among scholars and
practitioners,16 and the proffered solutions vary widely and range
across a spectrum.17
My approach to assessing the criminalization of domestic violence moves beyond the characteristic either/or dichotomy in various
ways. In an earlier research study, for example, my co-authors and I
examined the mechanism by which mandatory arrest laws are, often
incorrectly, categorized by researchers and others.18 This project,
(noting the unduly high rate of domestic violence arrests of African American men and
discussing the racial bias in the criminal legal system itself, including an increased risk
for the African American male of police abuse, being denied bail, and receiving harsher
sentences); Lisa M. Martinson, Comment, An Analysis of Racism and Resources for AfricanAmerican Female Victims of Domestic Violence in Wisconsin, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259,
270 (2001) (“The specific concerns of African-American women such as maintaining racial
unity and avoiding the propagation of stereotypes against African-American men are not
addressed by the common state domestic violence resources of mandatory arrest and
restraining orders offered by the police and the court system.”); Symposium, Battered
Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, Elizabeth M. Schneider, Christine
Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Renée Römkens, & Marianne Wesson 10 J.L. & POL’Y
313, 332 (2002) (“I wonder if the success of the battered women’s movement in bringing
[domestic violence] cases to court and achieving at least minimal standards for arrest, prosecution, and even occasional incarceration is in part because it dovetailed with . . . the
increase of control and surveillance over men of color.” (quoting Sally Engle Merry)). Contra
Evan Stark, Insults, Injury, and Injustice, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1302, 1321 (2004)
(demonstrating that mandatory arrest laws decrease police bias against black men).
15. See, e.g., Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159 (2003) (analyzing mandatory arrest policies and no-drop prosecution policies and concluding that
these policies are not mutually exclusive with victim empowerment policies).
16. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have Is a Hammer: Society’s
Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 974 (2011)
(“In general, the criminalization of domestic violence and IPV in particular has engendered considerable debate.”).
17. Linda Mills argues, for example, that the criminal realm is not the ideal forum
in which to address domestic violence, preferring instead a kind of restorative justice
model that places accountability on both victim and perpetrator. LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT
TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE 103 (2003) (“The Intimate
Abuse Circle . . . is designed to counteract the punishment-oriented trend that precludes
dialogue between the parties.”). Other scholars suggest that the desires of victims be
taken into account when making decisions about arrest and prosecution. See, e.g., Han,
supra note 15, at 166–67. In Donna Coker’s view, all domestic violence provisions should
be analyzed first through a “material resources test” to determine whether they offer a
tangible benefit to victims. Coker, supra note 13, at 1009.
18. April M. Zeoli et al., A Summary and Analysis of Warrantless Arrest Statutes
for Domestic Violence in the United States, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2811, 2811,
2814 (2011).
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while illuminating important differences among laws that tend to
be categorized similarly, something that is vital for researchers and
practitioners alike, does not offer solutions to the problematic nature
of what remains a traditional one size fits all approach. As a general
matter, I am intensely critical of this uniformity. So many of the
existing laws, policies, and practices tend to impose a prescribed
response—namely arrest—to a problem that is vastly different for
each victim and batterer in a violent relationship.19
Scholars have long recognized that the complexity of domestic
violence renders the creation of solutions inherently problematic: “In
crafting the societal response to IPV, it should be recognized that
IPV is a complex phenomenon for which the most appropriate and
effective response can vary considerably.” 20 The current singular
criminal response that might, on the one hand, be necessary as a matter of practicality and public welfare, may in many ways be considered a “win” for victims,21 and is arguably effective in some respects.
It at least theoretically removes offenders from the relationships
and imposes some kind of punishment. It does not, however, respond
to the needs of all victims, or respond to all of a particular victim’s
needs. Many victims never become engaged with the criminal justice
system in the first place; others who do still face tremendous barriers
that compromise their safety and/or impede their ability to break
away from the abuser. “In particular, women who are otherwise
marginalized within society remain on the outside with respect to
these services and remedies.” 22 Reconciling these competing ideas
has proved challenging.
19. Other scholars have observed this phenomenon. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Because
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 92, 94 (2006), http://www
.thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/65.pdf (last updated Aug. 09, 2011) (arguing for a constant rethinking of domestic violence laws that resist uniformity and explaining that
“[t]he criminalization of domestic violence is still in its infancy, and we have much to
learn about what works best and for whom.”); see also Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 942
(“Scholars who have researched IPV similarly diverge as to the nature of the problem, its
contributing factors, and how to ameliorate it. However, this divergence may be caused
in part by a mistaken tendency to address IPV as a monolithic phenomenon, when in
actuality there exists two relatively distinct forms of IPV that require different societal
responses.”). For a different take on the one size fits all response, see Zeoli et al., supra
note 18, at 2814–15 (exploring the considerable differences in the mandatory arrest law
requirements, and noting that the laws are often lumped together into one general category by scholars, experts, and practitioners).
20. Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 1001.
21. It was not that long ago that the wide-ranging discretion exercised by law enforcement and prosecutors in deciding whether to arrest or prosecute resulted in an extensive
pattern of non-response.
22. Conference, Mainstream Legal Responses to Domestic Violence vs. Real Needs of
Diverse Communities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13, 60 (2001) (quoting Jenny Rivera) (focusing
specifically on the experience of Latina women and their difficulties in accessing domestic
violence services).
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The debate about whether criminalization is the right response,
in theory or as applied, functions largely as a distraction. To be sure,
there are valid arguments made by experts on both sides of the debate about the utility of criminal law as a response to domestic violence. But despite the important ongoing work that attempts to
assess and evaluate the criminal law response, the divergence in
opinions has resulted in what might best be described as an impasse
in the movement. This work should be ongoing, and researchers and
social scientists should continue to assess and test the effectiveness
of the existing scheme, preferably working collaboratively and involving a variety of actors in their efforts. The limitations inherent
in reconciling the complex problem of domestic violence with the
singularity of the current legal response begs the conceptualization
of a new, victim-centered framework—one which builds on, offers
improvements to, and complements the existing criminal law.
As a point of illustration, some states have recently enacted legislative and policy initiatives that address domestic violence in new
ways by acknowledging the complexity of the issue, especially in the
context of the impact on and relevance for victims.23 These innovations, which range in their focus from addressing housing discrimination to improving victim safety as it relates to victim protective
orders, have the potential to provide more far-reaching help for those
affected by domestic violence beyond the obvious arrest or punishment of the batterer. They move beyond the “one size fits all” characteristic of existing mandatory arrest legislation and serve as a
complement to, not necessarily a replacement for, the traditional criminal law response. A survey of these new laws reveals that many recognize the multiplicity of domestic violence victims’ experiences and
support the idea that “[w]omen’s perceptions and reactions to abuse,
as well as the help available to them, are influenced by the lens
through which they see the world and the intersectionality of the
different cultural influences on their lives.” 24 In other words, they
move beyond the very narrow assumption that arrest of a batterer
is the best (or only) way to address the problem of domestic violence
and recognize that the actual abuse is but one part of a much larger
web of issues faced by victims.
23. See infra Part IV.A.
24. Fran S. Danis & Shreya Bhandari, Understanding Domestic Violence: A Primer,
in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTERSECTIONALITY AND CULTURALLY COMPETENT PRACTICE 29,
29 (Lettie L. Lockhart & Fran S. Danis, eds., 2010) (exploring the impact of “different
cultural influences” that affect victims of domestic violence, including “race, ethnicity,
age, citizenship status, (dis)ability, sexual orientation, religion, military involvement,
and geographical location.”).
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The next phase of the movement should purposefully work to
transcend the traditional approach by incorporating more victimcentered laws and policies. In doing so, however, I do not suggest
that there ought not be a criminal law response, but that the existing
debate is not the only way to inform solutions that are ultimately
beneficial to victims of domestic violence. In making such a recommendation, I am not suggesting that the uniform criminal response
be replaced by a similarly uniform civil response. Rather, quite to
the contrary, I advocate for the creation of an array of laws and policies from which victims might find additional workable solutions
and remedies. A state that includes a comprehensive menu of legislative options is likely to meet a greater number of any particular
victim’s needs, and the needs of a larger number of victims. Not everyone will access all of the available options, but this scheme will allow for a more tailored, victim-specific approach, which transcends
the more uniform response that is currently in place.
This paper focuses on selected laws and policies, specifically
those in the realm of housing and victim safety vis-à-vis orders of
protection, as a model for such a proposal. These laws were chosen for
two primary reasons. First, they address issues that are inherently
relevant to victims whether or not they have intersected with the
criminal justice system. Second, they have been the subject of recent
legislative action; their arrival is relatively new and also quite novel.
There are many specific intersections between domestic violence
and housing, including a strong connection between homelessness and
domestic abuse. Victims often face discrimination in finding housing
because of their status, or they are subject to eviction based on their
“involvement” with the crime of domestic violence. Sometimes victims
even find themselves legally bound to a lease with their abuser; as
a practical matter in such instances, the law effectively aids the batterer in maintaining control over the person he is abusing.
Civil and criminal orders of protection provide a measure of
protection against future abuse, but the protection is not automatic,
guaranteed, or even inherently effective and is largely dependent on
the willingness of third parties (i.e., law enforcement) to intervene.
Orders of protection bear a relationship to the criminal law in that
they are put into place by the courts either in conjunction with criminal sanctions or are sought by victims who have been harmed. Laws
and policies that attempt to improve the limitations of orders of protection offer a victim-centered approach to a mechanism that has the
potential to be beneficial.
Both of these issues, housing and orders of protection, are ripe
for the creation of new legislative strategies, and some states have
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seized on this opportunity. Together they offer an illustration of the
kinds of innovations that might be most effective in transcending
the criminal law’s “one size fits all” approach to domestic violence.
Although these particular state-based interventions are clearly
more victim-centered and exist outside of the traditional criminal
law response, which focuses on the arrest of batterers, they are also
subject to criticism in that their impact may not be very far-reaching.
States and localities, however, influence one another in various ways;
they are aware of and often model their legislation after one another.25
One might argue that advocating a preference for more uniformity in
state laws gets right back to the place of prescribing a “one size fits
all” response to the problem as is characteristic of the criminal law.
However, these new legislative innovations in the area of housing
and orders of protection offer options to victims; not all victims will
need protection from discrimination in housing, nor will all victims
require electronic monitoring of their abusers as part of an order of
protection. But the existence of these new laws does allow for a more
tailored response to the problem of domestic violence, one that ultimately exists outside of the criminal law. Ideally, states will see these
as models that will inspire the creation of even more innovative,
victim-centered laws.
This article begins with an exploration of the impact and dynamics of domestic violence and includes a historical and contemporary overview of the legal system’s response. It also includes a
discussion of what research reveals about the needs of victims and
argues that this ought to inform the direction of any future policy
agenda. This article also explores the debate that has ensued among
scholars and activists about the effectiveness and desirability of
using criminal law as a primary tool to combat domestic violence.
Finally, this article concludes by proposing a new conceptual framework using selected victim-centered laws and policies as a starting
place to illustrate how such innovations can effectively complement
the existing criminal law response. This vision requires that lawyers,
law enforcement, and legislators work more closely with social scientists, victims, mental health practitioners, and battered women’s
advocates to craft effective, far-reaching solutions.26 I rely on innovative expressions of federalism to define the potential impact of
25. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
26. In a different context, my co-authors and I similarly argue that “social science
researchers must team with legal scholars to clearly define these constructs and conduct
the legal research required to determine classifications and implementation dates so that
the field may advance and inform the ongoing debate on the appropriateness and effectiveness of these laws.” April M. Zeoli et al., Mandatory, Preferred, or Discretionary: How
the Classification of Domestic Violence Warrantless Arrest Laws Impacts Their Estimated
Effects on Intimate Partner Homicide, 35 EVALUATION REV. 129, 149 (2011).
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state-based legislation, using the example of innovative state laws
in the area of housing and victim protection orders as a point of illustration. This new framework should inform the next phase of the
domestic violence movement.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
A. The Problem of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence has been and continues to be a serious issue
in the United States, despite a greater awareness of the issue by politicians and law enforcement agencies. It is estimated that one in
every four women in the United States will experience domestic violence in her lifetime.27 Each year, 1.3 million women are victims of
physical assault by an intimate partner,28 and eighty-five percent of
all victims of domestic violence against an intimate partner are
women.29 Statistics reflecting violence among members of marginalized communities are also revealing. For instance, “American
Indian and Alaskan Native women experience a higher rate of violence than any other group, including African-American men and
other marginalized groups.” 30 It is believed that nearly forty percent
of Native American women have experienced domestic violence.31
Women in immigrant communities are also at risk.32 “In addition to
the economic and social challenges facing immigrant women, empirical research consistently demonstrates that immigrant women
27. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2, at 9.
28. Id. at iv. Women are much more likely than men to be victimized by a current or
former intimate partner. MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 224390, NATIONAL
CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2007 6 (2008), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv07.pdf. Women are “84% of spouse abuse victims and
86% of victims of abuse at the hands of a boyfriend or girlfriend,” and “about three-fourths
of the persons who commit[ ] family violence [are] male.” MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 207846, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS: INCLUDING STATISTICS
ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 1 (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content
/pub/pdf/fvs02.pdf.
29. See RENNISON, supra note 2, at 1.
30. Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law
Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 456 (2005); see also STEVEN
W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 203097, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME v (2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/otj/pdf/american_indians_and_crime.pdf; CALLIE
RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 176354, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AND RACE,
1993–98, at 9 (2001), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvr98.pdf.
31. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2, at 26.
32. Deborah K. Weissman, Addressing Domestic Violence in Immigrant Communities,
65 POPULAR GOV’T 13, 13 (2000) (illuminating the prevalence of domestic violence in immigrant communities in the United States, and describing how immigrant victims face
an added vulnerability because of their immigration status).
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married to U.S. Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents are especially vulnerable to domestic abuse.” 33
Females who are twenty to twenty-four years of age have the
highest risk of nonfatal intimate partner violence.34 Although most
cases of domestic violence are never reported to the police, onethird of female homicide victims that are reported in police records
are killed by an intimate partner.35 On average, more than three
women a day are murdered by their husbands or boyfriends in the
United States.36
Domestic violence is in itself a vicious cycle.37 Witnessing violence between one’s parents or caretakers is the strongest risk factor
for transmitting violent behavior from one generation to the next.38
For instance, “[b]oys who witness domestic violence are twice as
likely to abuse their own partners and children when they become
adults.” 39 In addition to the negative (and sometimes permanent)
physical and emotional impact on individual victims of domestic violence, society as a whole is also affected by the aftermath this problem.
Domestic violence can be perpetuated in a variety of ways. Batterers can engage in physical, emotional, sexual, and/or financial
control over their victims. It is more complex than is immediately
obvious, involving, most characteristically, a pattern of control exerted over one’s intimate partner or family member. Legal scholar
and expert on domestic violence Elizabeth Schneider explains that
“[b]attering fits within a larger picture of abuse of power.” 40 This
manifests most obviously as physical violence perpetrated by one
spouse against another, but it also includes emotional abuse and sexual violence and extends into a myriad of intimate or familial relationships. “Domestic violence is perpetrated by adults or adolescents
against their intimate partners in current or former dating, married, or cohabiting relationships of heterosexuals, gay men, lesbians,
33. Jacqueline P. Hand & David C. Koelsch, Shared Experiences, Divergent Outcomes:
American Indian and Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER &
SOC’Y 185, 190 (2010) (“Indeed, the lifetime prevalence of intimate partner violence among
Latina immigrant women exceeds the 21 percent prevalence in the general population
by almost twofold.”).
34. CATALANO, supra note 5, at 9.
35. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2000 18 (2001), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/crime-in-the-united-states-2000.
36. In 2005, 1181 women were murdered by an intimate partner. CATALANO, supra
note 5, at 7.
37. See Power and Control Wheel, supra note 6.
38. Irene Hanson Frieze & Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY VIOLENCE
163, 185 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989).
39. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS 1 (2007),
available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf.
40. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 12 (2000).
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bisexuals, and transgendered persons.” 41 The Power and Control
Wheel depicts the tools that batterers use to control their partners
beyond physical violence.42 While the legal system deals primarily
with physical abuse, understanding the wide-ranging ways in which
batterers abuse their partners is critical to understanding the dynamics of domestic violence and the complexity surrounding the
questions of why victims fail to leave abusive relationships or cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutors.43
The effects of domestic violence extend beyond the acute battering or control that occurs within the context of a relationship.
Domestic violence is connected, for example, with poverty.44 Specifically, “[w]omen in low-income households experience violence at significantly higher rates than women with higher annual incomes.” 45
This can be particularly problematic when those victims living in
poverty want to leave their abusive partner; their resolve to remain
independent of the batterer is often challenged by their (lack of) economic resources.46
As a related matter, domestic violence is also a leading cause
of homelessness because access to affordable housing is often not
available.47 “The lack of affordable housing, often combined with loss
of employment, leads many victims of domestic violence and their
41. Danis & Bhandari, supra note 24, at 30.
42. Power and Control Wheel, supra note 6. Forms of violence include coercion and
threats, using immigration status as a tool of control, intimidation, financial control, asserting male privilege, using children as a mechanism of control, isolation, and minimizing or denying the abuse and blaming the victim. Id.
43. For a comprehensive and compelling discussion of obstacles that preclude victims
from leaving abusive relationships, see Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a.
Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28 COLO. LAW. 19, 19 (1999).
44. To provide some context for the frequency of the connection between poverty and
domestic violence, research shows that women who receive Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families experience IPV ten times more often than other women. Leigh Goodmark, Law
Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions
for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 38 (2004).
45. Id.
46. Nancy Wright, Voice for the Voiceless: The Case for Adopting the “Domestic Abuse
Syndrome” for Self Defense Purposes for All Victims of Domestic Violence Who Kill Their
Abusers, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF 76, 84 (2009).
47. See Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against
Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377, 389 (2003); see
also NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, SOME FACTS ON HOMELESSNESS,
HOUSING, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1 (2009), available at http://www.nlchp.org
/content/pubs/Some%20Facts%20on%20Homeless%20and%20DV.pdf. Congress identified
the link between domestic violence and homelessness when it passed the Violence Against
Women Act and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005. 42 U.S.C. § 14043(e)(7)
(2006) (“Victims of domestic violence often return to abusive partners because they cannot find long-term housing.”); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 13 (explaining how
many victims of domestic violence become homeless due to the abuse, and how the battering and homelessness can force victims into a difficult cycle from which to break free).
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children into homelessness if they try to leave abusive relationships.” 48 This further complicates the choices for victims of domestic
violence who consider leaving their abusers. “Thus, violence is a tool
for maintaining women’s economic inferiority to, and dependency
on, men.” 49
The battered women’s movement helped place the problem of
domestic violence on the public policy agenda; the resulting proliferation of research that generated statistics and information about
dynamics has helped change attitudes and shift priorities. “Society
now widely accepts elimination of intrafamily abuse as a crucial
goal, and it has been illegal in most states since the late nineteenth
century. But the problem remains one of epidemic proportions.” 50
B. Early Origins: The Private Nature of Domestic Violence
An understanding of how the legal system currently responds
to domestic violence is best informed by looking at its early origins.
Domestic violence was once thought of as a private matter, best dealt
with within the confines of the home. This approach is not inconsistent with the historic reluctance of the legal system generally to intervene into marital or family concerns, with the doctrine of coverture,
or with the widely recognized right of chastisement, that is, a man’s
common law right to “subject his wife to corporal punishment . . . as
long as he did not inflict permanent injury on her.” 51 And even a
hundred years after courts no longer recognized this right, “the
American legal system continued to treat wife beating differently
from other cases of assault and battery.” 52
As recently as the 1970s, law enforcement was routinely encouraged as a matter of policy to “look the other way” when officers
encountered disturbances among family members. Scholars Lisa
Goodman and Deborah Epstein explain, “police officers historically
failed to recognize the criminal dimension of intimate partner abuse,
ignoring domestic violence calls, delaying their response by several
hours, or insisting on mediation rather than arrest.” 53 A 1968–69
48. Meris L. Bergquist, After the Violence: Using Fair Housing Laws to Keep Women
and Children Safe at Home, 34 VT. B.J. 46, 46 (2008).
49. Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the
Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 70 (2002).
50. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 3 (1999).
51. Reva B. Siegel, Civil Rights Reform in Historical Perspective: Regulating Marital
Violence, in REDEF INING EQUALITY 29 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998).
52. Id. at 30.
53. Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction for Policy
and Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479, 480 (2005).
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International Association of Police Chiefs Training manual further
illustrates this point:
Once inside the home, the officer’s sole purpose is to preserve
the peace . . . [a]ttempt to soothe feelings, pacify parties. . . . In
dealing with family disputes the power of arrest should be exercised as a last resort. The officer should never create a police
problem when there is only a family problem existing.54

Such instructions suggest a reluctance to acknowledge the seriousness of battery. In Michigan, a manual for the Police Training
Academy encouraged officers to “[a]void arrest if possible” and to try
to “[a]ppeal to their vanity.” 55 This policy of non-intervention fortunately did not continue for the duration of the century. Beginning
in the 1970s, the battered women’s movement gained momentum
and major changes in policy, laws, and attitudes took hold.
During the 1980s and 1990s, a flood of legislation regulating the
discretion of law enforcement in cases of domestic violence was implemented throughout the United States. Police officers’ discretion
about whether to make an arrest when they encountered domestic
violence was restricted and they were subsequently “statutorily mandated to make arrests upon a finding of probable cause.” 56 The legal
system’s response was initially predicated on an assumption that
those who experienced domestic violence were “uncomplicated victims in need of protection.” 57 This view was short-lived, however, as
the inherent complexity that characterized battering relationships
became more evident and widely understood.
II. THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S CURRENT RESPONSE TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
As evidenced by the historical evolution of domestic violence as a
societal problem, “[u]ntil recently, legal fictions, social prejudices, and
criminal justice apathy and ignorance combined to define domestic
violence as a nonevent.” 58 Today, the legal system offers a fairly comprehensive response that has been constructed around the idea that
54. Siegel, supra note 51, at 38, 39 (emphasis omitted) (citing INT’L ASS’N OF POLICE
CHIEFS, TRAINING KEY NO. 16, HANDLING DISTURBANCE CALLS 94–95 (1968–1969)).
55. Steven M. Cook, Domestic Abuse Legislation in Illinois and Other States: A Survey
and Suggestions for Reform, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 261, 268 (1983).
56. Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case
but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 191, 199 (2008).
57. Id. at 200.
58. NEAL MILLER, INST. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REVIEW OF STATE
LEGISLATION DEFINING POLICE AND PROSECUTION DUTIES AND POWERS 3 (2004), available
at http://www.ilj.org/publications/docs/Domestic_Violence_Legislation.pdf.
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domestic violence is a critical social problem requiring a shift from
considering it a private family matter and that victims are often
uncooperative in the role they play as part of the broader system.59
It has only been over the course of the past thirty-five years
that legislation has been used as a tool to combat the problem of
domestic violence. “Waves of unprecedented statutory changes beginning in the 1970s have altered the official response to domestic
violence.” 60 Most of the state legislative changes took place around
mandatory arrest.61 On the federal level, Congress responded to the
epidemic of domestic violence with its passage of the Violence Against
Women Act in 1994.62 And across the country, law schools, the site
of educating future lawyers, judges and lawmakers, adopted new
courses and curriculum on the topic.63
A. State Legislation: Mandatory Arrest and Victim
Protection Orders
State legislatures eventually passed laws that addressed the
historic pattern of non-response to domestic violence by law enforcement; these mandatory arrest laws required various degrees of arrest
(usually mandatory, discretionary or preferred) by law enforcement
responding to domestic violence-related crimes.64 Previously left up
to the discretion of an officer responding to the scene of a domestic
violence incident, today every state allows for warrantless arrests in
misdemeanor cases of domestic violence,65 “subject to a police officer’s
determination that probable cause exists to believe domestic violence occurred.” 66 Professor Emily Sack explains, “[t]he goals of these
changes were to counter police resistance to arrests in domestic violence cases by removing or restricting police officer discretion; mandatory arrest policies would increase police response and reduce

59. Kohn, supra note 56, at 193. As a result, “[s]ystem actors have reconciled these
conflicting conclusions by implementing aggressive intervention policies that exclude
victims.” Id.
60. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 109 (3rd ed. 2003) (explaining how “explosive change” in the legislative arena
followed Pennsylvania’s passage of the Protection from Abuse Act of 1977).
61. See Zanita E. Fenton, State-Enabled Violence: The Story of Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 379, 391 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie
M. Wildman eds., 2011) (discussing how the battered women’s movement brought about
legal and social reforms that led to the enactment of mandatory arrest laws).
62. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 60, at 123.
63. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 8.
64. See Zeoli et al., supra note 18, at 2811.
65. Id.
66. MILLER, supra note 58, at 4.
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batterer recidivism.” 67 The motivation behind this legislation had at
its core a desire to increase the number of arrests made in domestic
violence cases.68 The policies also had the objective of taking the
pressure off of victims to make the decision about whether to have
the batterer, who was often also her husband or intimate partner,
arrested. Further, a related goal was to change community perceptions about the seriousness of domestic violence.
Many feminist scholars and activists pushed hard for such mandatory interventions.69 These statutes have, without question, opened
up victims’ access to the criminal justice system.70 “These policies
also represent an important symbolic shift: a clear declaration by
the state that it no longer condones violence against women.” 71 Every
state now has a criminal statute that directs law enforcement on
standards for arrest when responding to domestic violence calls.72
These arrest laws, commonly referred to as “mandatory arrest”
provisions, actually vary widely in their requirements and are the
subject of considerable debate.73 Passed initially to regulate what
amounted to widespread discretion and patterns of non-response by
law enforcement, today experts debate the utility and impact of these
provisions, with little agreement.74 One major critique is that mandatory arrest laws do not allow for recognition of the complexity of domestic violence or the marked variance among victims: “Mandatory
intervention strategies are crafted to seek a unitary goal that does
not vary from case to case or victim to victim.” 75
State legislatures also passed laws beginning in the 1970s providing for the availability of civil protection orders, which prohibited,
at least on paper, a batterer from making further contact with the
victim.76 “By the mid-1990s, every state had enacted a civil protection order statute, including provisions for obtaining an emergency
ex parte order.” 77 Orders of protection provide a remedy to victims
67. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1670 (2004).
68. Kohn, supra note 56, at 235.
69. See, e.g., Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Battering:
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 271–72
(1985) (articulating sweeping legislative changes to address the ongoing problem of
domestic violence).
70. Goodman & Epstein, supra note 53, at 481.
71. Id.
72. See Zeoli et al., supra note 18, at 2811.
73. See id.; see also Zeoli et al., supra note 26, at 130.
74. For a comprehensive discussion about the debate that has ensued about the
utility of the criminal justice response, see infra Part IV.
75. Kohn, supra note 56, at 235.
76. Pennsylvania was the first state to allow victims to obtain a civil protection order
in 1977. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 60, at 109.
77. Sack, supra note 67, at 1667.
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of domestic violence by requiring batterers to stay away from victims
in very specific ways like “prohibiting abusers from continuing to
assault, threaten, harass, or physically abuse victims; requiring that
they stay away from victims’ homes, places of employment, children’s
schools, and other places frequented by the victim; [and] precluding
batterers from contacting their victims . . . .” 78 Advocates and scholars
argued for their widespread availability. In 1983, for example, Stephen
Cook wrote that “[m]any states have responded to the domestic violence crisis by enacting domestic abuse legislation which provides
for a temporary restraining order, or protective order.” 79
Violations of any of the provisions outlined in the victim protective order are considered criminal contempt in most states.80 Despite
the conceptual and practical benefits of victim protection orders, and
their extremely widespread utilization by victims,81 they offer only
limited protection from abuse and their utility has been subject to
much criticism: victims do not utilize them, batterers are often not
served with the orders, they are frequently violated, courts sometimes provide for mutual orders of protection where both parties are
ordered to stay away from one another, the orders are frequently not
enforced by law enforcement, nor do victims have a right to have them
enforced, and perpetrators are not punished for violations.82 Problems
abound with service of process and research shows that about onefourth of all protection orders are violated by the batterer;83 it is not
uncommon for these violations to go unnoticed or unpunished and
victims therefore are left without remedies.84 Rosenfeld describes the
78. Goodmark, supra note 44, at 10.
79. Cook, supra note 55, at 271. States also addressed other facets of interpersonal
violence through legislation:
Among the more significant advances in criminal law relating to domestic
violence are (1) the adoption of antistalking laws in 50 states where there
were none in 1989; (2) repeal or limitation of states’ spousal exemption laws
in rape cases; and (3) passage of new domestic violence battery laws that
provide unique penalties in family-related assault and battery cases.
MILLER, supra note 58, at 4.
80. Sack, supra note 67, at 1667 (stating that as of 2002, thirty-eight states and the
District of Columbia had enacted laws making violation of a civil order criminal contempt).
81. MAUREEN SHEERAN & EMILIE MEYER, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY
COURT JUDGES: FAMILY VIOLENCE DEP’T, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: A GUIDE FOR
IMPROVING PRACTICE 2 (2010), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/cpo
_guide_0.pdf (“Today, civil protection orders are the predominant legal remedy victims
use to extricate themselves from the violence.”).
82. See discussion on the problems with enforcement of orders of protection, infra
Part IV.A.2; see also Diane L. Rosenfeld, Correlative Rights and the Boundaries of
Freedom: Protecting the Civil Rights of Endangered Women, 43 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV.
257, 257–58 (2008) (lamenting the weakening of rights protecting victims of domestic
violence, explaining the limitations inherent in orders of protection, and advocating for
new solutions).
83. Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 258.
84. Id.
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widespread belief that, “[o]rders of protection provide limited and unreliable protection from further abuse of the victim by the offender.” 85
When a victim does report a violation of an order of protection
and law enforcement refuses to take action, the results can be tragic.
Such a scenario played out for Jessica Gonzales, a mother of three
children with an order of protection in place that prohibited her abusive husband from making unscheduled visits.86 “While the Gonzales
children played outside in their front yard on June 22, Simon made
an unscheduled visit and took possession of the three girls in violation
of the protective order.” 87 Despite repeated phone calls to law enforcement by Ms. Gonzales that her husband took the children in violation of the order, the police refused to respond.88 Later that evening,
“after ten hours, five phone calls and a police report at the station
requesting enforcement of the validly obtained protective order, Simon
Gonzales came to the police station on his own accord and opened
fire.” 89 Later, “the murdered bodies of ten-year old Rebecca, eightyear old Katheryn and seven-year old Leslie Gonzales were found
inside the cab of their father’s bullet-ridden truck.” 90
The Castle Rock case exemplifies the problematic nature of
under-enforcement. According to Cheryl Hanna, “[i]t can be incredibly difficult to get the criminal law to respond—even when a victim
is clear and consistent about what she wants.” 91 After Castle Rock,
those difficulties are even more profound. Further,
[c]ritics claim this ruling significantly undercuts the strength
and value of protective orders, as it allows police officers to enforce the orders—or not—at their own discretion, it leaves victims of IPV with little legal recourse when they are not enforced,
it perpetuates and condones law enforcement’s indifference to
IPV calls, and it conveys to both abusive individuals and their
victims that IPV will be tolerated by society.92

Although the passage of legislation reflects an increasing awareness of, and responsiveness to, the problem of domestic violence,
limitations remain.
85. Id.
86. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751 (2005).
87. Fenton, supra note 61, at 379.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 380.
90. Id.
91. Hanna, supra note 19, at 92, 94 (critiquing arguments made by legal scholar
Jeannie Suk, who suggests that states are intervening too heavily into the private lives and
relationships of individuals in ways like mandatorily issuing criminal orders of protection).
92. Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 991.
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B. Federal Legislation: The Violence Against Women Act
Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in
1994,93 and subsequently reauthorized the Act in 2005,94 which created an array of protections and policies on domestic violence. “The
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 . . . was the nation’s first attempt
at a wide-ranging federal response to the devastation caused by rape,
domestic violence, and other forms of violence against women.” 95
VAWA was a culmination of four years of Congressional consideration of the epidemic of domestic violence.96 Extracted from the data
and statistics studied by Congress was the fact that as the rate of
crimes dropped, gender-based crimes like rape and domestic violence rose at alarming rates.97
VAWA requires that states enforce out-of-state orders of protection, and creates special immigration policies for victims.98 In
addition, VAWA “advocates mandatory arrest and pro-prosecution
policies, training for court personnel and judges, better record keeping of statistics, and an increased commitment to victims’ services
and rehabilitation.” 99 It also provides special discrimination and
early lease termination protections for victims who reside in subsidized housing, as discussed more fully in Part IV.100
Scholars tend to agree that “[t]he most significant and most
controversial aspect of VAWA was the civil rights provision, which
declared for the first time that gender-motivated violent crime is a
violation of the victim’s federal civil rights.” 101 The provision allowed
for a civil cause of action to be initiated against anyone, regardless
93. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), 42 U.S.C. § 3981 declared unconstitutional by United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
94. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
95. Goldfarb, supra note 49, at 64. Importantly, the civil rights provision of VAWA
made clear that gender-motivated violence goes far beyond just an individual assault.
Id. at 73 (“[I]t is part of a social pattern of discrimination by members of one group
against members of another.”).
96. Id. at 66.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 64. There are three general ways that VAWA helps undocumented victims
of domestic violence: VAWA Self Petition, Cancellation of Removal, and Battered Spouse
Waiver. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2006); 8
U.S.C. § 1186c(4)(C) (2006).
99. Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1516 (1998).
100. See infra Part IV.A.1.
101. Goldfarb, supra note 49, at 64–65.
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of whether they were acting under state law, for crimes that were
motivated by gender.102 Indeed, the controversy was ultimately addressed by the Supreme Court in 2000 when it declared the provision unconstitutional, effectively stripping victims of violence of one
of their few existing federal protections.103 The federal VAWA civil
rights protection read:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives
another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall
be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.104

In United States v. Morrison, the Court refused to find a basis
for a victim’s private cause of action against her attacker in the
commerce clause.105 “Without access to a federal cause of action,
many women now lack an effective legal remedy for acts of violence motivated by gender.” 106 Writing the Court’s opinion, Justice
Rehnquist conceded that, assuming the facts to be true in the instant case, “no civilized system of justice could fail to provide her a
remedy for the conduct of respondent Morrison.” 107 Despite this
concession, however, he was unwilling to extend that remedy federally. He continued, “under our federal system that remedy must
be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the
United States.” 108 Ultimately,
The civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act
was one in a long line of federal legislative measures that the
Rehnquist Court has invalidated, in whole or in part, on federalism grounds during the past decade. Morrison thus provides
fertile ground for an examination of the Court’s current mode of
federalism analysis.109

102. Id. at 65.
103. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2006).
105. Morrison, 529 U.S at 617–19.
106. Goldfarb, supra note 49, at 94 (explaining how at the time Morrison was decided, “[s]tate and local civil rights remedies for gender-discriminatory violence [were]
nonexistent in most jurisdictions; where they [did] exist, they [were] inconsistent and
often inadequate”).
107. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
108. Id.
109. Goldfarb, supra note 49, at 62.
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Many states responded after the Morrison decision by passing their
own mini-VAWA statutes, extending a state-based, private cause of
action to survivors of domestic violence.110
While VAWA is critical in that it extends a myriad of protections to victims of domestic violence and brings this issue to the
forefront of the national agenda, inherent limitations permeate the
legislation, as evidenced by the ruling in Morrison. It also does not
go far enough.
C. The Response of Legal Education
Finally, it is worth noting that the legal profession has, over the
past twenty years, been increasingly responsive in its efforts to address domestic violence, particularly in the context of law schools.
The American Bar Association (ABA), as evidence of its commitment
to this issue, created a section on domestic violence;111 its priorities
include increased attention to how law schools are—or are not, as
the case may be—addressing domestic violence in the classroom.112
Through the initiative Educating to End Domestic Violence, the ABA
encouraged law schools to address domestic violence in core curricular
offerings (e.g., in property and torts courses) in addition to offering
specific courses and clinics devoted to the topic.113 Professor Schneider
explains that “legal education plays a crucial role in shaping the attitudes of future lawyers and judges who will be handling these
cases, and in directing the future of feminist lawmaking.” 114 In my
own seminar on domestic violence, I emphasize the importance of
law students gaining at least a cursory understanding of the problem, in order that they best serve the interests of their clients.
Today, numerous law schools have taken up the issue of domestic
violence in their curricula, either by the creation of special domestic
violence course or clinics, or by including relevant materials in other
core courses.115
Yet, despite such efforts, Professor Schneider remains critical
of the lack of formal education and training about domestic violence
that is provided to lawyers: “Lawyers who do not know about the
complexity of intimate violence, or who bring to the process of
110. See, e.g., Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 994 (highlighting another example of
how state laws have changed since Morrison to benefit survivors of domestic violence).
111. See AM. BAR. ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 8, at I-9.
112. Id. at I-8.
113. Id. at I-15.
114. SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 229.
115. Id. at 223, 225.

2013]

TRANSCENDING THE “ONE SIZE FITS ALL” RESPONSE

323

representation biases and misconceptions concerning battered women,
are not going to be able to listen. They will dismiss the woman’s story
as trivial or see the woman as ‘difficult.’ ” 116 She also notes that it is
critically important that our nation’s judges understand many of the
“myths and misconceptions” that surround the experiences of victims of domestic violence.117 A legal profession, and particularly its
judiciary, that is informed on these dynamics will serve victims and
society well in addressing this problem.118
III. DIVERGING OPINIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND DYNAMICS
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Legal scholars, researchers, lawyers, and activists disagree about
the desirability of using criminal law as a tool to address the problem of domestic violence. Historically, many feminists were skeptical about engaging with the state for a variety of reasons.119 A legal
system that previously refused to take victims seriously could hardly
be trusted to suddenly advocate for them. On the other hand, however,
some argued for strong state intervention to create legitimacy around
the problem of domestic violence.120 The debate about the effectiveness and utility of criminal domestic violence laws results largely in
a dichotomy of opinions: some in favor of and others in opposition to
mandatory criminal laws and policies like mandatory arrest and
aggressive prosecution.121
Today, the debate rages on, with strong, often divergent, opinions about the role of criminal law in addressing domestic violence.
116. Id. at 229.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., id. at 211 (“The critical work of feminist lawmaking on domestic violence
can be accomplished only if there are lawyers who are sensitive to these issues of gender
and violence, lawyers who are committed to representing battered women and understanding the problems of domestic violence, and lawyers who are not so personally involved
with or conflicted about violence that they are hindered from effective representation.”).
119. Id. at 182–84 (providing a comprehensive overview of the breadth of feminists
who were reluctant to engage with the state surrounding issues of violence against women).
Many in this movement were skeptical of an affirmative role for the state;
they saw the state as maintaining, enforcing, and legitimizing male violence
against women, not remedying it; they rejected the idea that battered women
activists ought to trust the state, expect much from the state, or engage
with the state in any way.
Id. at 182.
120. SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 186.
121. Although the focus of this paper is on criminal laws like mandatory arrest, these
laws can easily be addressed alongside aggressive/no-drop prosecution because of the
tendency to compare them in the literature; many of the arguments criticizing and supporting them are similar. See Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 984 (“Mandatory-arrest
laws and no-drop prosecution policies are supported by similar arguments.”).
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On one end of the spectrum, legal scholar Linda Mills criticizes the
criminal approach, rejecting it as an adequate or desirable solution
to reduce violence against women.122 Mills is well known for her critique of the use of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies
to combat the problem.123 She does not view domestic violence as
something that can be effectively solved with punishment; instead,
she sees it as a problem of psychological dimensions that exists between the victim and perpetrator, both of whom bear a share of
responsibility.124 Mills acknowledges, as others have, that “[a]s the
studies so strongly suggest, the criminal justice system has not
found a way to adequately address the problem of intimate abuse.” 125
Although she shares the goal of reducing all intimate partner violence,
her work departs from others in suggesting that both parties bear
responsibility for abuse, and rejects the use of the labels “victim”
and “batterer.” 126 She instead advocates for a removal of domestic
violence from the criminal justice realm.127 In her view, domestic
violence is best addressed with a version of restorative justice, something she refers to as the Intimate Abuse Circle.128
Other scholars also take issue with the criminal justice approach,
but, unlike Mills, are inclined to continue to primarily address domestic violence in the criminal realm.129 Their critique concerns the
way in which the criminal justice system has used mandatory arrest
and aggressive prosecution policies, arguing that they ignore the
opinions of victims, and deny them agency and autonomy.130 “[A]s
police and prosecutors escalate their response to domestic violence
cases, survivors increasingly confront a criminal justice system that
can perpetuate the kinds of power and control dynamics that exist
in the battering relationship itself.” 131 Prosecutors, in many situations, drown out victims’ voices by taking charge of the case and
taking over as the sole decision-maker.132 Critics maintain that these
122. MILLS, supra note 17, at 32. But see Sack, supra note 67, at 1716 (critiquing Linda
Mills’s approach to domestic violence. According to Sack, Mills “lambasts the criminal
justice system and the feminists who support its use in domestic violence for disempowering victims” and has replaced the criminal approach with one that similarly exclusively relies on mental health professionals to address the problem.). In Sack’s view,
Mills simply replaces one ineffective structural mechanism with another. Id.
123. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 14, at 1331.
124. MILLS, supra note 17, at 137.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 87, 138.
127. Id. at 134, 140.
128. Id. at 137–38.
129. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 50, at 4–5.
130. Id. at 17.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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laws “disempower victims of IPV by taking away their ability to decide whether the batterer should be removed or punished, which implies that victims are too weak, helpless, or incapable to make these
decisions themselves.” 133 Legal scholar Elizabeth Schneider explains,
“[i]t is widely recognized that mandatory arrest and no-drop rules
are, at best, imperfect solutions to domestic violence because of the
extreme risk to women’s autonomy.” 134 Schneider identifies four major criticisms in the criminal justice response.135 She argues that this
response essentializes women’s experiences, presuming to know what
all women need in a somewhat paternalistic manner; it puts victims
in a position of re-victimization and coercion by the state, beyond
what was done at the hands of their batterer; it raises the potential
for retaliation by the perpetrator; and it disempowers women by
destroying their autonomy.136
Others strongly advocate for the existence and continued proliferation of mandatory criminal laws and policies.137 Professor Hafemeister
explains how “[p]roponents argue that such policies are necessary for
public safety, for protecting the victims, and for preventing the batterer from pressuring the victim to drop the complaint.” 138 Despite
the controversy that surrounds mandatory arrest laws, those in favor of such laws argue that they require law enforcement to take the
issue seriously and diminish the possibility of it being dismissed as unimportant or trivial.139 On the other side of this debate, “[p]roponents
contend that society should more routinely and directly intervene in
cases of IPV by utilizing the mechanisms of mandatory reporting, investigation, arrest, prosecution, and sentencing—even over objections
from victims who assert that they neither want nor need assistance.”140
There are also scholars who take a more middle ground approach.
Professor Emily Sack identifies the limitations of mandatory policies,
but is also persuaded by their utility.141 “[D]o proponents of this discretionary structure really believe that without mandatory policies
in place, the criminal justice system would make the ‘right’ choices
and adhere to victims’ desires to treat domestic violence seriously
133. Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 980; see Kohn, supra note 56, at 211 (explaining
how victims opposing the prosecution of their batterer are silenced by the policies and
procedures of aggressive prosecution).
134. SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 185.
135. Id. at 186.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 185–86 (identifying four major strands of arguments in favor of mandatory prosecution).
138. Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 984.
139. Id. at 979.
140. Id. at 940.
141. Sack, supra note 67, at 1687.
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(when they wanted them to)?” 142 Sack rejects an outright abandonment of mandatory policies.143 Instead, she argues that implementation problems should be dealt with by examining the problematic
components of these laws and policies.144 While physical violence
perpetrated against a person requires legal intervention:
[T]he legal system’s definition of domestic violence and the
totality of battered women’s experiences of domestic violence
bear little resemblance to one another. While many abused
women are victims of physical violence, the daily reality of their
abuse is so much more than physical violence, a reality not
reflected in the narrow range of behaviors that the legal system
can reach.145

To add to the complexity and confusion, the social science research on the effectiveness of mandatory arrest policies is inconclusive.146 “Studies now show that mandatory arrest has, at best, a
mixed impact on reducing intimate partner violence.” 147 There are
many explanations for the lack of consensus about whether these
laws make a difference in reducing violence.148 Indeed, much of the
conversation about domestic violence and the criminal law response
has focused on whether mandatory arrest laws and aggressive prosecution strategies are actually effective or desirable as a matter of
policy. This focus has proved distracting from a central issue at the
core of the debate: for many victims, the criminal response is not
adequate to address their complex web of needs.
IV. TRANSCENDING THE CRIMINAL LAW’S “ONE SIZE FITS ALL”
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The criminalization of domestic violence is both revered and
criticized by scholars, lawyers, advocates and others, and the debate
has been well documented.149 “Continuing controversy remains
142. Id. at 1690.
143. Id. at 1694.
144. Id. at 1697.
145. Goodmark, supra note 44, at 28–29.
146. Goodman & Epstein, supra note 53, at 482.
147. Id.; see SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 185–86 (exploring some of the major arguments in favor of and against mandatory arrest policies).
148. In an earlier project, I explored the lack of consistency among researchers in their
classifications of mandatory arrest laws. Zeoli et al., supra note 26, at 148–49
(suggesting that researchers who analyze effectiveness of mandatory arrest laws arrive
at inconsistent results because of errors in classification of the statutes).
149. See discussion supra Part III.
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concerning the appropriate response of society in general, and the
criminal justice system in particular, to domestic violence.” 150 The
legal system has historically focused on addressing only the obvious,
physical manifestations of abuse by arresting batterers who commit
acts of physical violence against their victims or by protecting victims who have experienced physical violence vis-à-vis the issuance
of orders of protection. The dichotomous assessment of the criminal
law often leaves out two very relevant dimensions of domestic violence related to who is actually affected by the laws.
First, many victims of domestic violence never even interact
with the law. This is a massively under-reported crime. And, if domestic abuse does not rise to the level of physical violence, there may
be no mechanism by which the law could intervene. Donna Coker
explains that “[t]he current orthodoxy relies too heavily on crime
control interventions despite the fact that many battered women
have no contact with the criminal justice system.” 151 Existing interventions, then, often do not have a chance of being effective.
Second, even among those victims who do engage with the legal
system, they rarely get all of their needs met by the criminal law
response and are often left facing difficult barriers that impede their
ability to leave the abuser or move on with their lives. Goodmark
reminds us that “[w]hile many abused women are victims of physical violence, the daily reality of their abuse is so much more than
physical violence, a reality not reflected in the narrow range of behaviors that the legal system can reach.” 152 Even beyond this dichotomy, many become frustrated when they expect that all victims
will respond similarly and this does not occur. The experiences of
victims of interpersonal violence could not be more varied. “[M]any
system actors who expect or even hope for all victims to have the
same level of unambiguous commitment to intervention by the
justice system are repeatedly disappointed by the population they
seek to protect.” 153
Yet, until recently, most legislation that addresses domestic violence has ignored the realities of victims, focused primarily on the

150. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 60, at 3.
151. Coker, supra note 14, at 1348 (agreeing with Linda Mills’s assessment about the
over-reliance on criminal law generally for addressing domestic violence, but suggesting
that Mills goes too far by focusing only on the psychological dimensions; her “reform
proposal ultimately falls short in addressing the reality of women’s lives”).
152. Goodmark, supra note 44, at 29 (explaining how the legal system is often not a
useful resource for victims of domestic violence for whom physical abuse is not the primary way in which they are harmed because of its narrow definition of domestic violence).
153. Kohn, supra note 56, at 193.
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criminal law, and ultimately furthered a “one size fits all” approach
to the problem.154 To this point, criminal justice Professor Eve Buzawa
and attorney Carl Buzawa describe four categories into which state
laws surrounding domestic violence typically fall: “(a) the police response to domestic violence, (b) the handling of cases by prosecutors
and the judiciary, (c) the increased availability and enforcement of
civil restraining orders, and (d) the development of efforts to educate
the public and victims about the problem, as well as its prevention
and possible solutions.” 155 These four categories illustrate the limitations surrounding the existing statutory provisions. Although each
category is different, revealing that some legislation exists outside
the criminal realm with its focus, for example, on public education,
there remains a problematic “one size fits all” thread that omits
laws that reflect the varying needs of victims. While mandatory arrest and aggressive prosecution are likely an important part of the
solution, it is not realistic to envision that one legal strategy will
singularly respond to a particular victim’s needs. In fact, interventions that work in one situation often have opposite, harmful effects
in another.156 These four categories are useful in illuminating the
paucity of laws that are both responsive to victims’ needs and exist
outside the criminal sphere.
The importance of laws that address both the nonuniformity of
violence and the unique needs of victims is highlighted by legal
scholar Thomas Hafemeister, who explains that society’s “response
can be counterproductive if it fails to adequately distinguish among
various types of IPV or does not provide sufficient latitude, flexibility,
and nuance for responding to the different needs, desires, and circumstances of the victims.” 157 In his view, it is important not only to
be responsive to the variance among victims’ needs, but also to the
fact that IPV can manifest in very different ways.158 An exclusive
criminal approach “without also empowering the victim, can diminish the victim’s feelings of self-worth and increase the victim’s isolation, dependence, and vulnerability.” 159 All of these negative effects
can lead to future victimization.
These glaring limitations, however, present rich opportunities
for legislative innovations to help victims of domestic violence that
fall outside the scope of arrest and prosecution and that complement,
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 211.
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 60, at 109.
Goodman & Epstein, supra note 53, at 481.
Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 1000.
Id.
Id.
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rather than replace, the criminal law.160 Indeed, the law can be an
effective tool in meeting the needs of victims in ways that transcend
the boundaries of mandatory police intervention and aggressive courtroom prosecution. Although not widely accepted, “a small body of
research has emerged indicating that responding flexibly to victims’
needs and providing them with advocacy and broad social support
could be a more successful strategy for eliminating domestic violence.” 161 Many scholars tend to agree that a focus on the needs of
victims is critical, especially in the context of increased attention
to intersectionality.162 Professor Schneider explains, “[i]f feminists
are to engage with the state, it must be to ensure that the interrelationships among violence and gender, work and violence, economic resources, homelessness, and the material constraints of
gender are central to both theory and practice in domestic violence
legal reform efforts.” 163
Although on a practical level it makes sense to collectively define the experience of all victims under the label of domestic violence, this broad categorization sometimes serves to presuppose that
all victims live a common, shared experience when in fact there are
very real, very relevant differences. Instead, “[d]omestic violence
advocacy should fully engage particularity by accounting for difference[s] between individual victims.” 164 Responding otherwise can, unfortunately, essentialize the experience of victims and further inhibit
the accessibility of and effective provision of services.165 Violence cuts
160. For a comprehensive discussion of the limitations inherent in the current legal
mechanisms for protecting victims of domestic violence, see Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First Century: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 357, 358 (2008). “There are major problems with the two
primary legal vehicles for protection that have been developed—civil protective orders
and criminal sanctions—both of which are problematic, unsatisfactory, and limited.” Id.
161. Goodman & Epstein, supra note 53, at 480.
162. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 44, 47
(2009) (“The experience with mandatory policies should serve as a cautionary tale, though,
prompting advocates and policy makers to think carefully before enacting laws and
policies that bind all women who have been battered, notwithstanding those women’s
own goals, beliefs, choices, and situations.”).
163. SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 198.
164. Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving Forward
in Lawyer and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 250 (2011) (explaining how each victim brings unique experiences and is an individual: “One victim may be,
for example, a woman, an immigrant, an undocumented person, low-income, Chinese,
a Christian, and monolingual. These realms of experience will affect her experience of
abuse and her needs.”).
165. Conference, supra note 22, at 60–61 (quoting Jenny Rivera). Rivera explains that:
[C]urrent legal remedies and institutional services do not fully respond to the
needs of all women. In particular, women who are otherwise marginalized
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across lines of class, race, ethnicity, education and more. To assume
that experiences and needs are similar regardless of one’s standpoint is problematic.
To counter the assumption that all victims experience the same
dynamics and have identical needs, some scholars have begun to pay
attention to the divergent needs of victims of domestic abuse.166 I am
certainly not the first scholar to consider alternative or complementary approaches.167 “Responses to domestic violence will always depend on a range of strategies, including the criminal justice system.”168
Donna Coker is well known for her innovative strategy, the “material
resources” test, which she suggests should be applied to any initiative
within society remain on the outside with respect to these services and
remedies. As members of outsider communities, women of color, immigrant
women, disabled women, and poor women continue to face tremendous
obstacles accessing services and particularly legal strategies.
Id.; see also Hand & Koelsch, supra note 33, at 186.
166. Legal scholar Jenny Rivera focuses specifically on the needs of Latina women
survivors of domestic violence: “Unless anti-intimate partner violence strategies respond
to economic and social inequalities, any strategy will perpetuate and exacerbate those
inequalities.” Conference, supra note 22, at 62 (quoting Jenny Rivera). Rivera identifies
numerous challenges that Latina women face specifically, in their access to domestic
violence services. Examples include: language barriers with a lack of bilingual service
providers, and preferences to seek services from other Latinas. Id. at 62–63 (quoting
Jenny Rivera). Professors Goodman and Epstein similarly point to the unique needs of
women whose cultural or ethnic backgrounds predispose them to rejecting help from law
enforcement in the first place. Goodman & Epstein, supra note 53, at 483–84.
167. See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 56, at 191. Kohn articulates that “we find ourselves
at a key moment in time to reassess our systemic response to domestic violence. In developing those responses, system actors and judges must recognize the value of victim
participation and recalibrate their policies and decision-making protocols to encourage
and incorporate victim perspectives.” Id. at 244. Although I agree with Kohn’s conclusion
about the necessity of new responses to domestic violence, we differ markedly in our approach. See also Goodmark, supra note 44, at 40–45. Goodmark’s approach looks outside
of the law to address the shortcomings of the legal system. Id. at 44–45. She also argues
that it does not follow that just because the legal system is the primary resource for
dealing with domestic violence that victims, especially those in immigrant and other outside communities, will automatically access its array of options. Id. at 36. “[T]here are a
number of promising initiatives for addressing domestic violence that bypass the legal
system altogether, focusing on prevention rather than reacting to violence that has already occurred, the legal system’s typical posture.” Id. at 41. See also Carey, supra note 164,
at 221–22 (suggesting a shift away from the traditional ways in which lawyers (and law
school legal clinics) have addressed this issue and embracing a more holistic approach).
“Domestic violence practitioners should move away from overly-specialized family law
practices, and individual assistance should include advocacy on behalf of victims in a
breadth of cases, including but not limited to public benefits, immigration, housing, mortgage foreclosure, tort, and financial matters.” Id. at 221.
168. Deborah M. Weissman, Domestic Violence and the Postindustrial Household, in
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 121, 125 (Evan Stark & Eve
Buzawa eds., 2009) (“A paradigm shift from the criminal justice system—which relocates
domestic violence from a single site of human interaction—to the multiple realms of political economy would offer a number of promising analytical possibilities.”).
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connected to domestic violence, including “anti-domestic violence
law, policy, funding priority, [and] administrative rule.” 169 This test
inquires, “[w]hat is the impact, what is the effect of this law, policy,
regulation, et cetera, on the material resources of the women who
are likely to come in contact with this law, policy, regulation, et
cetera?” 170 In her view, if there are no measurable goals for battered
women inherent in a particular law, it should be treated with suspicion. “[L]aw that diminishes battered women’s material resources
should be eliminated.” 171 Deborah Epstein calls for improvement in
the existing system by directing reform efforts at three parts of the
justice system: in police and prosecutors’ response, in judicial system
information sharing, and in judges’ attitudes toward victims of domestic violence.172 Emily Sack explains how strategies can be created
to further the existing successes of the movement.173 Such development recognizes that the criminal procedures and policies “can be
maintained and improved, while broadening our response to involve
diverse community organizations and members, to listen to the concerns of battered women, and to include and strengthen services
that we know are critical to assisting domestic violence victims in
the long term.” 174
Other scholars have recognized the need for innovation, particularly in light of recent cases whose holdings restrict the rights
of victims.175 Citing the Supreme Court’s opinions in Morrison and
Castle Rock, effectively striking down the right to be free from
gender-motivated violence and the right to compel enforcement of
an order of protection from domestic violence, one scholar acknowledges that “[t]he probability that these decisions will be reversed in
the near future is low. If we wish to right the current imbalance, we
need to look for new approaches.” 176
Law professor Camille Cary, in advocating for a shift toward a
more holistic law practice surrounding domestic violence, concedes
that “[t]here is a well-established and thoughtful debate about domestic violence priorities in the criminal context. Surprisingly there

169. Donna Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of Economic
Rights, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 189 (2003).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 190.
172. Epstein, supra note 50, at 13.
173. Sack, supra note 67, at 1740.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 965 (2005); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
176. Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 260.
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is not a fully developed parallel body of scholarship about priorities
in the civil context.” 177
New state laws and policies offer one such possibility. This void
that permeates the civil realm offers a window of opportunity for
meaningful change to be promulgated. “The tension that exists between the goals of battered women’s advocates and the state will
never be fully resolved. But, the choice, in practical terms, between
state intervention and listening to victims may not be as stark as it
once seemed.” 178 Policy shapers and creators must listen to the victims and their advocates while creating a criminal justice response
to create solutions that will ultimately be inclusive and effective.179
A. Recent Innovations in State Lawmaking & Policies that Are
Responsive to Victims’ Needs
Over the past few years, some states have passed increasingly
innovative legislation that falls outside of the traditional criminal
realm. This legislation represents a departure from the narrow conception of how to best address needs of victims. The innovations and
related potential inherent in these new state laws are reminiscent
of words expressed by Justice Brandeis in 1932, in his dissent in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebman: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.” 180 Some states have, indeed,
responded to the crisis of domestic violence by creating new, innovative legislative solutions. The success of these solutions in one state
can provide inspiration and guidance to others.
My observation is that some of the most promising of these new
laws fall into two broad categories: housing and orders of protection.
Although disparate in terms of their content, both categories share
the characteristic of responding directly to the needs of victims outside of the criminal realm. In the housing arena, laws have been
passed that prohibit discrimination by landlords against victims of
domestic violence, giving victims certain rights that move beyond
the narrow criminal framework. The effectiveness of orders of protection is constantly questioned by lawyers, social scientists, advocates, and even victims; an array of new laws and policies that
provide for electronic monitoring of batterers and improve service
177.
178.
179.
180.

Carey, supra note 164, at 240–41.
Sack, supra note 67, at 1738.
See id. at 1727.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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of process of protective orders are all attempts to fill the gaps inherent in these limitations.
By presenting a range of new options for victims, these steps suggest at least the tentative conclusion that state lawmakers have an
increased understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence.181 They
also beg the creation of a fifth additional category, the Buzawa law
classification scheme,182 one that exists alongside the criminal law
and reflects realities that are indicative of victims’ needs more broadly.
1. State Housing Laws
Despite increased understanding of domestic violence among
actors in the legal system and the broader community, individuals
who are battered still face significant bias, stigma, and often very
real discrimination based on their status as victims. One place in
which this discrimination is felt strongly is in the area of housing.
One of the unique characteristics of domestic violence that differentiates it from other crimes is the existence of an intimate relationship between victim and perpetrator. Although not all abuse
occurs between two cohabitating partners, the interconnectedness
inherent in an intimate relationship contributes to an already complex web of issues that often prevent victims from leaving their
abusers or moving on with their lives.183 “Most people experience
home as a safe haven and refuge from the outside world. This experience of home is shattered when a woman suffers domestic violence
from an intimate partner and tries to end the relationship.” 184
Sharing a home, and a lease, can also add a level of practical
complication that interferes with a victim’s decision to leave the
relationship, and fuels a perpetrator’s ability to control her. Being
stuck with legal obligations to fulfill the terms of a lease also can tie
the victim to the batterer in a very real way. Without adequate financial resources, what may appear as a logistical housing complication can actually have the effect of serving as a very real, tangible,
often insurmountable barrier to leaving an abusive relationship.
“While battered women may have several reasons for ambivalence
181. Other scholars have similarly noted this trend, albeit in different, narrow, contexts. See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion
of State Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
669 (2008) (exploring a trend of state-based domestic violence legislation that focuses in
an employment law context).
182. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 60, at 109.
183. For a comprehensive list of some of the reasons why victims stay with their
abusers, see Buel, supra note 43.
184. Bergquist, supra note 48, at 46.
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about leaving an abusive relationship, economic dependency is repeatedly cited as a primary reason for staying with their batterers.” 185
There is a strong correlation between homelessness and domestic violence. Research reflects this reality.186 A survey conducted by the
National Conference of Mayors revealed that twelve cities surveyed
identified domestic violence as “a primary cause of homelessness.” 187
Congress acknowledged the connection in its reauthorization of the
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization
Act of 2005.188
While victims of domestic violence often end up homeless as a
consequence of the abuse, demonstrating one example of the farreaching impact of this problem, it is also true that many homeless
women are victims of domestic and sexual violence. As many as
ninety-two percent of homeless women are the victims of sexual or
domestic abuse at some point during their lifetime.189
Domestic violence has a significant effect on victims who live in
poverty for a number of reasons. According to Donna Coker,“poor
women are more vulnerable to repeat violence; yet, relatively few
dollars are allocated for measures that would render them less vulnerable, such as transportation or education or job training.” 190 The
economics of domestic violence has been studied and measured by
scholars Amy Farmer and Jill Tiefenthaler.191 Their research reveals
that income is correlated to levels of violence: “The comparative
stati[stics] derived from the noncooperative model provide some
clear predictions on the determinants of violence in an abusive relationship. An increase in the woman’s income is predicted to decrease the amount of violence.” 192
185. Sack, supra note 67, at 1734; see also Lapidus, supra note 47, at 389.
186. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, LOST HOUSING, LOST SAFETY:
SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXPERIENCE HOUSING DENIALS AND EVICTIONS
ACROSS THE COUNTRY 2 (2007), available at http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/NNEDV
-NLCHP_Joint_Stories%20_February_20072.pdf (“Domestic violence is a leading cause
of homelessness nationally.”).
187. THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A
STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 64 (2005), available
at http://www.usmayors.org/hungersurvey/2005/HH2005FINAL.pdf.
188. H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. § 41401 (2005) (“There is a strong link between domestic
violence and homelessness . . . . Of all homeless women and children, 60 percent had
been abused by age 12, and 63 percent have been victims of intimate partner violence
as adults.”).
189. Id.
190. Coker, supra note 169, at 188.
191. Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence, 55
REV. SOC. ECON. 337, 337 (1997).
192. Id. at 352. “Increased opportunities outside the marriage made available through
services provided by the government, charities, and family members and large divorce
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Poverty also cuts across lines of race and ethnicity. Research on
the impact of domestic violence on American Indian women, for
example, suggests that while an increase in criminal prosecutions
and jurisdiction resolutions may be useful, the crux of the problem
lies more with extreme poverty and isolation.193 Any reforms designed
to address interpersonal violence must “defy any generic approaches
to domestic violence” because of the “[j]urisdictional complexities
and economic and social realities particular to Indian country.” 194
The unique challenges faced by American Indian women, as well as
by other minorities, require careful consideration of how to effectively craft the legal response.
Although emotional, financial, and legal ties frequently function
to force a victim to share her home with the batterer or to face escape without a home at all, two additional factors complicate housing
for victims of domestic violence: discrimination perpetuated against
victims by landlords in various contexts, and the inability to break
away from a housing arrangement because of the legal requirements
imposed by a lease. “In addition to the harms battered women suffer
at the hands of their abusers, victims of domestic violence also face
discrimination from third parties[, like landlords and housing authorities,] as a result of the battering.” 195 Many landlords refuse to
rent property to victims of domestic violence in the first place: “The
inability of victims of domestic violence to secure new housing is . . .
a national problem.” 196 It is not uncommon for a victim’s name to
appear, for example, in a criminal background check conducted by a
landlord as a prerequisite to renting property.197 These background
checks often reveal the names of both parties to an action, and can
include the victim’s name.198 In such contexts, it is not uncommon
for landlords or those who run housing companies to deny rental
applications from victims of domestic violence.199 Additionally, some
landlords refuse to rent to someone whose last known address is a
domestic violence shelter.200 In this way, many of the remedies
settlements for women are also expected to decrease the level of violence in the
household thereby improving the woman’s marital utility.” Id. at 353.
193. Sumayyah Waheed, Domestic Violence on the Reservation: Imperfect Laws,
Imperfect Solution, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 287, 294 (2004).
194. Id. at 296.
195. Lapidus, supra note 47, at 377–78.
196. Bergquist, supra note 48, at 46.
197. Lapidus, supra note 47, at 384–85.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 186, at 9–11. Other
reasons that motivate landlords to refuse to rent to domestic violence victims include
when the police have been called to former residences, or learning from previous landlords that the prospective tenant was in an abusive relationship. Id. at 9.
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available to victims actually have the unintended consequence of
preventing them from moving on.
It is an unfortunate reality that many victims who try to leave
abusive relationships end up returning to their abusers because
they are unable to find housing.201 Victims of domestic violence
also face the risk of eviction. It is not an uncommon practice for
landlords to evict victims when they learn of their involvement in
a violent relationship.202 “[A]t the very moment when the need for
a safe, stable home is the greatest, a female victim of domestic
violence is most likely to be evicted and unable to secure new housing because she is a victim.” 203 This phenomenon illustrates the all
too common experience of re-victimization by the state or other societal factors.
Many victims also find themselves legally entrapped in a violent relationship because of a shared lease, or a lease tying them
to an unsafe place. Practically speaking, victims who face socioeconomic challenges may not be able to leave. The fear of legal and
financial repercussions from a landlord who may enforce a lease
agreement serves as an additional barrier for many victims to break
away from the abuse and seek safety for themselves and, in some
cases, their children.
Congress’s reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act
in 2005 addressed the housing crisis facing victims of domestic violence in limited ways. The legislation included two new protections
for individuals who live in government subsidized housing. VAWA
addressed some of these needs by specifically forbidding discrimination against victims living in public housing,204 and allowing for
early lease termination upon proof of a domestic violence crime.205
While these provisions are critical, they reach only a small number
of battered individuals in very limited contexts. In 2012, recognizing
some of these limitations, the proposed reauthorization of VAWA
expands, in part, these protections for victims in the housing context
by widening the applicability of these two provisions to rural, lowincome housing tax credit programs and other federally supported
housing initiatives.206
201. H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. § 41401(7) (2005).
202. Lapidus, supra note 47, at 390. Lapidus explains further that “[e]victions of
battered women also demonstrate the ways in which women’s economic and other forms
of dependency on their batterers exacerbate their vulnerability.” Id. at 389.
203. Bergquist, supra note 48, at 46.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(3) (2006); id. § 1437d(1)(5).
205. Id. § 1437d(1)(6).
206. S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012).
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Increasingly, some states have recognized that these protections allowing for lease termination for all tenants, not just for those
living in government-subsidized housing, is reflective of good public
policy and can be a useful tool in combating the problem of domestic
violence within their borders. These states have enacted laws that
appear to be inspired by and in fact mirror the terms of the federal
VAWA provisions. Others have taken a varied approach by enacting
either an anti-discrimination law or a lease termination provision.207
In 2004, prior to federal recognition of the problem through VAWA,
Colorado became the first state to pass a lease termination law;
since then, an additional seventeen states (including the District of
Columbia) have enacted landlord-tenant laws that provide a mechanism for victims of domestic violence to terminate a lease early,
without penalty, upon a showing of violence.208 Of the states with
one or both of these housing laws, a majority passed legislation the
same year as or in a subsequent year to the reauthorization of the
VAWA in 2005, suggesting that attention was paid to what was
happening federally.209
To date, a total of twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
have passed some sort of housing-related law that is connected to
domestic abuse.210 Nine states and the District of Columbia have
passed anti-discrimination in housing statutes, and seventeen states
and the District of Columbia have passed lease termination laws;
only four of these states (California, Delaware, North Carolina, and
Washington) and the District of Columbia have in place a combination of the two kinds of statutes.211 The states that have both kinds of
provisions offer the most comprehensive protections for victims of
domestic violence. The problem with states that have only lease termination statutes in place was highlighted by the State of Michigan
in its analysis of a prospective lease termination bill—namely, the
possibility of a backlash against victims: “The duty that the bill would
impose on landlords could make them leery of renting to potential
domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault victims. If that happened, the bill actually could make it more difficult for victims to find
safe, secure living arrangements.” 212 Despite this acknowledgement,
207. See infra Table 1.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 185, at 3 (2010), available at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2009-2010/billanalysis/Senate/pdf/2009-SFA
-0185-E.pdf.
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Michigan does not have an anti-discrimination statute in place for
domestic violence in the housing context.
To be sure, one of the well-founded criticisms of these housing
laws may be that they remain out of reach for a large number of
victims. It is indeed questionable whether individuals who are unlikely to interact with the criminal justice system will have access
to information about their legal rights under state law. Here, there
could very well be a disconnect between legislative innovations and
the people whom the laws are designed to protect. The relationships
among lawmakers, domestic violence advocates, clergy, social workers,
and others is therefore paramount in helping disseminate information and educating communities.
TABLE 1: STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOUSING LAWS
State
Arizona
Arkansas

Type*
LT
AD

California

LT, AD

Colorado

LT

Delaware

LT, AD

D.C.

LT, AD

Illinois

AD

Indiana
Louisiana
Maryland

LT
AD
LT

Michigan

LT

Minnesota
New Hampshire
New Jersey

LT
AD
LT

Statute Citation & Date Effective
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1318 (2007)
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-112(b)
(West 2007)
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3 (West
2011); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.7 (West
2008)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402
(West 2004)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (West
2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5316
(West 2008)
D.C. CODE § 42-3505.07 (2009); D.C.
CODE § 2-1402.21 (2009); D.C. CODE
§ 42-3505.01 (2012)
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-106.2
(West 2010)
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-31-9-12 (West 2007)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:506 (2004)
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-5A-02
(West 2010)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.601b
(West 2010)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.206 (West 2007)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 (VII) (2010)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.4 (West 2008)
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Type*
LT

Statute Citation & Date Effective
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227-c
(McKinney 2007)
North Carolina
LT, AD N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-45.1 (West
2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42.2
(West 2005)
North Dakota
LT
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-16-17.1
(West 2009)
Oregon
LT
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453 (West 2008)
Rhode Island
AD
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-2.4
(West 2002)
Texas
LT
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016
(West 2006)
Utah
LT
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-5.1 (West 2005)
Washington
LT, AD WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West
2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580
(West 2004)
Wisconsin
LT
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.16 (West 2008)
*AD=Anti-Discrimination, LT=Lease Termination. States with both statutes
have LT listed first, followed by AD.

2. Addressing Victim Safety Through Improving the
Effectiveness of Orders of Protection
Once someone has been harmed by an intimate partner, whether
or not there has been intervention by the criminal justice system,
that individual may receive judicial protection vis-à-vis an order of
protection. These orders are in some ways a cornerstone of the movement to address domestic violence.213 An order of protection is a “court
order that imposes legally binding restrictions on an offender’s future conduct” and is used in both civil and criminal contexts.214 Although the specific way in which a victim of domestic violence comes
to be protected by such an order may differ,215 challenges with enforcement are basically the same and present very real threats to
213. See discussion supra Part II.A (covering contemporary response through protection orders).
214. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can
Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1506, 1508 (2008).
215. In the civil context, a victim of domestic violence can approach the court for an
order of protection in a proceeding that does not attach to a criminal charge or divorce.
The criminal law, by contrast, empowers prosecutors to ask for and judges to impose
orders of protection as a component of sentencing.
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one’s personal safety. While it is difficult to ascertain an exact figure,
we know anecdotally and from the local and state statistics that are
available that it is not an uncommon practice for orders of protection
to never be served on batterers, a required step which is essential for
their subsequent enforcement.216 Even when service of process has
occurred, a victim must notify law enforcement of a violation by the
batterer, and law enforcement must, in turn, respond. Finally, and
as a related matter, victims are sometimes unaware that an abuser
is about to or has violated an order. Batterers frequently use this
lack of knowledge as a way to further wield control over and perpetuate fear in their victims.
The story of Marie Moses Irons, a technology director at a public school, is illustrative.217 Christopher Walter Howard Irons killed
Marie, his estranged wife, on December 28, 2002.218 He entered her
home while she was sleeping next to her two-year-old son, and,
using an ax, killed her.219 Her twelve-year-old son was also present
in the home at the time.220 Marie had obtained an order of protection
from the court just five days before she was killed.221 This tragedy
illustrates the limitations of protection orders, which often amount
to little more than a piece of paper.222 Whether Marie’s knowledge
of her estranged husband’s whereabouts would have prevented this
outcome is difficult to predict, but had she been alerted to his close
proximity to her home, she might have had the opportunity to
escape harm.
Despite the legal system’s heavy reliance on orders of protection, it is widely recognized that they are an inadequate mechanism
216. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Case Revives Debate Over Protection Orders, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/nyregion/27orders.html?ref=nyregion.
217. L.L. Brasier & John Masson, Estranged Wife Killed with Ax; Son Was at Her
Side; Husband Stands Accused, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 31, 2002, at B1, available
at LEXIS.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. What happened to Marie Irons is but one in a litany of similar stories. See, e.g.,
John Ingold, Warning Signs Go for Naught in Domestic Homicides, DENVER POST, June 27,
2004, at C-01, available at LEXIS. On May 14, 2004, Tina Esparza was shot to death by
her husband as she walked to her car in a municipal parking garage, with her keys in
her hand. Id. She was a mother of four and had filed complaints because of her husband’s
restraining order violations before her death. Id. See also Katelyn Tivnan, Tragic End
to Domestic Violence Case in Worcester, Mass., NEW ENG. CABLE NEWS (Feb. 7, 2012), http://
www.necn.com/02/07/12/Tragic-end-to-domestic-violence-case-in-/landing_newengland
.html?blockID=646996. Jose Soto, forty-year-old Belinda Torres’s ex-boyfriend, shot Torres
in the head twice after she came out of a grocery store. She died from her injuries. She
had a restraining order against Soto. Id.
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to keep victims safe.223 Their frequent use, coupled with their inherent limitations, suggests that as a policy matter, attention ought to
be focused on how to improve their effectiveness. Yet, for many years,
this has not been the case. Recently, to this end, states have made
efforts to address the disconnect, both through the creation of electronic monitoring provisions for batterers, and by increasing service
of process on batterers.
a. Electronic Monitoring of Batterers
As the story of Marie Irons illustrates, it is often not enough for
a victim to simply possess a valid order of protection. The order
itself does not guarantee a victim’s safety and may even bring with
it a false sense of security. Some states have responded to the challenges inherent in orders of protection by passing legislation allowing for the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to
track batterers and, in many cases, warn victims of impending violations of their orders.224 In the case of Ms. Irons, the outcome may
have been markedly different had her estranged husband been required to wear a GPS tracking device that notified her of his presence within close proximity to her home.
It is, of course, hard to know with any degree of certainty
whether the use of such technology accompanying Marie Irons’s
order of protection would have at least given her the opportunity to
have sought the assistance of law enforcement or better protected
herself from the final fatal abuse perpetrated against her by her
abuser. But, as a practical matter, as Diane Rosenfeld explains,
“[t]his technology offers a way to enforce the terms of an order of
protection, holding both the offender and the state accountable for
making the order offer the protection it claims to provide.” 225 Regardless, electronic monitoring of batterers “has the potential to
disrupt the cycle of domestic violence and give meaning to an order
of protection.” 226
Today, a total of fourteen states have enacted provisions for
using GPS or electronic monitoring of batterers against whom

223. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 160, at 357 (discussing the “intractable problems
concerning protection of abused women” and identifying the “problematic, unsatisfactory
and limited” nature of orders of protection in relation to victim safety).
224. See infra Table 2 for a list of states that have passed GPS legislation. For an
example of model GPS legislation, see Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 266.
225. Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 261.
226. Id. at 262.
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courts have issued victim protection orders, or in other contexts.227
All of the statutes are permissive, not mandatory, giving the courts
authority to require electronic monitoring under certain conditions
and contexts.228
In the state of Connecticut, which implemented a pilot project
to test the effectiveness of such electronic monitoring, the results
were profound. Over a one-year period, expending only $140,000,
the state monitored 119 high-risk batterers electronically.229 None
of these 119 batterers re-injured their victims during this period.230
The state recently allocated additional funding to run the program
for an additional year.231 Moving forward, states should partner
with social scientists, victim advocates, and others to continue to
monitor and assess the effectiveness of these statutes.232
Further, when a victim is equipped with a substantial amount
of certainty about the location of the person who abused her, it potentially enables her to stay in her home, “thus reversing the injustices in the current system.” 233 This illustrates a situation in which
multiple issues that victims of domestic violence face, like housing
and physical safety, intersect.
These statutes, which reflect the development of new technology and its application to the criminal context, vary in how they allow
courts to implement the electronic monitoring in conjunction with
a protection order, either in the context of granting bail or after
someone has been charged with a crime of domestic violence.234 They
also provide varying degrees of access to the information about a

227. See infra Table 2.
228. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2009) (using the permissive language
“may be ordered”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-11 (West 2012) (using the permissive language “may require”).
229. Josh Kovner, Domestic-Violence Offenders to Be Tracked Again, HARTFORD
COURANT, June 13, 2012, http://articles.courant.com/2012-06-13/news/hc-domestic-violence
-gps-0614-20120613_1_gps-device-alvin-notice-tiana-notice.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. As an example, the State of Maine recently began to study electronic monitoring
of domestic violence offenders. Over a two-year period, half of the homicides committed
in that state involved intimate partners. Alex Barber, LePage Matches $18,000 Donation
to Study Electronic Monitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
July 13, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 14713405. A measure introduced in the Maine
legislature last session which would have imposed an electronic monitoring law failed
to make it out of committee. Id.
233. Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 263.
234. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2009) (ordering, permissively, an individual in violation of an ex parte order of protection to wear a GPS monitoring system),
with IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-11 (West 2012) (requiring, permissively, that as a condition of bail, an individual charged with domestic violence wear a GPS monitoring system).
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batterer’s whereabouts.235 Oklahoma, for example, recently changed
its law from simply allowing GPS tracking for the benefit of law
enforcement personnel, to making the information about a batterer’s
whereabouts directly available to victims.236 As a practical matter,
many of the statutes do not provide much in the way of guidance on
implementation to the courts.237 The state of Washington enacted
the first statute nineteen years ago in 1994, followed by a statute
passed in 2002, in Utah. The remaining statutes have been passed
in the last few years.

235. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.6b (West 2008) (allowing the victim to be
notified via a GPS monitoring system that the defendant is located within a certain
proximity); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.17 (West 2008) (allowing the victim to monitor the
defendant’s location and to receive notice via computer or phone if the defendant is
within a certain distance).
236. Oklahoma’s law reads, in part,
In conjunction with any protective order or restraining order authorized by
this section, the court may order the defendant to use an active, real-time,
twenty-four-hour Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring device for
such term as the court deems appropriate. Upon application of the victim,
the court may authorize the victim to monitor the location of the defendant.
Such monitoring by the victim shall be limited to the ability of the victim to
make computer or cellular inquiries to determine if the defendant is within
a specified distance of locations, excluding the residence or workplace of the
defendant, or to receive a computer- or a cellular-generated signal if the defendant comes within a specified distance of the victim.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.17 (2008).
237. Indiana’s electronic monitoring statute was recently passed by the legislature and
made effective July 1, 2012. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-11 (West 2012). The law is exceedingly simple: “A court may require a person who has been charged with a crime of domestic violence . . . to wear a GPS tracking device as a condition of bail.” Id. The statute
also assigns the cost of the monitoring to the batterer but gives no guidance on who has
access to the information about a batterer’s whereabouts. Id. It is also unclear whether
it is reserved for purposes of law enforcement monitoring or whether it extends to victims affected by the violence. Id. But see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.6b (West 2008).
The State of Michigan has enacted comprehensive legislation on point. It provides for a
variety of issues that might arise in the context of electronic monitoring. Id. If the court
orders a defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device, the law provides that the victim may specifically have access to a device which alerts her to the presence of the batterer and also that she have telephone access to local law enforcement to enforce the order
should a violation occur. Id. § 765b(6). In the event of a violation, the local authorities
would also be notified. Id. Some states give general guidance to the courts about when
ordering a defendant to wear such a device would be appropriate. In Michigan, however,
the law is quite clear: “In determining whether to order a defendant to participate in
global positioning system monitoring, the court shall consider the likelihood that the
defendant’s participation in global positioning system monitoring will deter the defendant from seeking to kill, physically injure, stalk, or otherwise threaten the victim
prior to trial.” Id. Michigan also specifically imposes the cost of the GPS device on the
defendant, and provides that a victim shall not be subject to sanctions for refusing to
participate in the monitoring program—a component of the law which gives deference
to a victim’s autonomy and agency. Id.
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TABLE 2: STATE LAWS PROVIDING FOR ELECTRONIC
MONITORING OF BATTERERS
State
Arkansas
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Utah
Washington

Statute Citation & Original Date Effective
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2009)
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8A-7 (West 2009)
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-11 (West 2012)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (LexisNexis 2010)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2143 (2003)
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5-202 (West 2010)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2007)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.6b (West 2008)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-5-38 (West 2011)
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-07.1-19 (West 2009)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 60.17 (West 2008)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150 (West 2011)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-5 (West 2002)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060 (West 1994)

b. Increased Service of Process
Court imposed orders of protection are not legally binding until
they are served on the batterer.238 Nationwide statistics on the number of protection orders that go unserved and thereby offer no legal
protection to victims seeking help are unfortunately largely unavailable. Of the communities that do report such statistics, the percentages of protection orders actually served are small. In 2007, for
example, the Seattle police stated forty percent of their protection
orders went unserved the previous year primarily because the offender is evasive.239 One court administrator believed that about
one-third of protection orders are not served during their two week
valid period.240 Although the state of New York does not officially
keep track of the number of unserved orders of protection, advocates
who work with victims of violence there say they encounter this frequently.241 In St. Louis, domestic abuse orders of protection are served

238. Feuer, supra note 216.
239. Ruth Teichroeb, UW Shut Case Days Before Shooting: Campus Police Tried to
Find Abuser, Gave Up When He Couldn’t Be Located, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
May 17, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 9419133.
240. Id.
241. Feuer, supra note 216.

2013]

TRANSCENDING THE “ONE SIZE FITS ALL” RESPONSE

345

only at a rate of about forty-seven percent.242 According to a national
report produced by the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges and designed to provide best practices for all of the
system actors who work with domestic violence victims, “[d]espite
the fact that protection orders work to empower the victim and stop
the violence for many, the ability of the system to protect victims can
be impeded by barriers in both service and enforcement.” 243 Although
there is general agreement that this presents a significant problem,
little has been done.
The State of Illinois proved to be an exception in 2009. It was
reported that over twenty percent of batterers against whom courts
had initiated orders of protection had not been served.244 Attorney
General Lisa Madigan responded by creating an initiative called
“Serve to Protect.” 245 The program was designed to address the gap
in service of the orders and included the creation of an innovative
“Order of Protection Enforcement Group,” comprised of “the Cook
County Sheriff, the Cook County State’s Attorney, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Illinois State Police, the Illinois Sheriffs
Association, and advocates for domestic violence survivors throughout the State . . . .” 246 This collaboration among system actors in and
of itself is innovative, allowing all of those affected by the widespread problem of domestic violence generally, and service of process of orders of protection specifically, to work together to address
these problems.
The innovations on service of process that originated from Attorney General Madigan’s office differ from the other state-based initiatives discussed in this paper in that they are not legislatively derived.
They illustrate, however, how various state actors can play a critical
role in addressing the problem of domestic violence outside the legislative realm and provide an alternative model that other jurisdictions might consider. Although it is not clear what percentage of
orders of protection go unserved, there is widespread agreement
that this issue is one that is common among states and communities
across the country. The actions of Illinois State Attorney General
242. Take Wrist, Slap Lightly, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 21, 2003, at B6, available
at 2003 WLNR 16161059.
243. SHEERAN & MEYER, supra note 81, at 4.
244. Press Release, Ill. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Madigan Announces “Serve
to Protect” Initiative to Tackle State’s Unserved Orders of Protection on Behalf of
Victims of Domestic Violence (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://illinoisattorneygeneral
.gov/pressroom/2009_10/20091023.html.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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Madigan could serve as a model for other state attorneys general
and others in their efforts to combat domestic violence. Making improvements in terms of the number of protection orders actually
served will have a marked impact on the lives of victims who depend
on the orders as a tool to combat the violence.
B. The Economics of Domestic Violence Innovations
We cannot afford to continue to overlook the costs
of this national tragedy.247
As a nation, we pay an incredibly high price for the problem of
domestic violence. The Centers for Disease Control estimate the
price tag at over $5.8 billion annually.248 This amount reflects costs
like health care and mental health services. Violence perpetrated by
current or former husbands, boyfriends, and dates costs victims of
domestic violence almost eight million days of paid work.249 This
equates to more than 32,000 full-time jobs and almost 5.6 million
days of household productivity lost as a result of domestic violence.250
There are 16,800 homicides and $2.2 million in medically treated injuries due to intimate partner violence each year, which costs somewhere in the realm of $37 billion.251 This economic reality alone
demands attention.
With any proposed legislative measures, one of the primary
inquiries relates to the costs associated with implementation. Interventions that carry a high price tag may not be taken seriously, particularly when the economy generally is weak. These costs, however,
ought to be considered against the backdrop of the extraordinarily
high societal costs of dealing with the effects of domestic violence.
In some contexts, adding additional legislatively derived options
for victims costs very little. In considering the ramifications of the
early lease termination law in Michigan, for example, the House Fiscal
Agency’s Legislative Analysis concluded that “[t]he bill would have no
247. Roberta Cooper Ramo, ABA President-Elect Announces Domestic Violence Initiative,
29 FAM. L.Q. xi, xi (1995) (discussing the far-reaching impact, economic and otherwise,
of domestic violence, as background to the creation of a new national campaign).
248. JULIE L. GERBERDING ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., COSTS OF INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2003), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/IPVBook-a.pdf.
249. Id. at 1.
250. Id.
251. Domestic Violence: Effects on the Community, BATTERED WOMEN’S SHELTER OF
SUMMIT & MEDINA CNTYS, http://www.scmcbws.org/effects_on_the_community.asp (last
visited Jan. 18, 2013).
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fiscal impact on state or local government.” 252 That said, there are
other potentially hidden costs to consider. In a state that implements
an early lease termination statute without an anti-discrimination
provision, which is currently the trend in most states,253 it is likely
that landlords may refuse to rent to victims of domestic violence altogether, akin to a sort of preventive measure to avoid suffering negative economic consequences by losing tenants. This has the potential
to ultimately make housing less available to victims. Alternatively,
landlords may, in anticipating costs associated with the requirement
to terminate leases, decide to increase the rent that they charge on the
front end of all lease transactions. Such practices are not reflected
in the cost analyses of state and local governments, but they are
nonetheless potentially significant. Nonetheless, such statutes have
the potential to reduce violence by giving victims tangible benefits
that can help them leave abusive relationships.
In other contexts, however, like GPS monitoring of batterers, the
up front costs of implementation can be quite high. In Connecticut, a
state that has piloted a program to evaluate the effectiveness of a monitoring program, officials have determined that the program would
carry a $2 million price tag annually.254 In fact, after running the initial project, which spanned three court districts in the state for a year,
the state ran out of funds.255 Only recently were they able to allocate
another $510,000 to facilitate another year of the project.256 These expenses, however, must be viewed alongside the outcomes of the pilot
program. In its first year, there was not one additional injury to a
victim by a batterer who was being monitored, leading one to at least
tentatively conclude that this can be an effective strategy to reduce
domestic abuse.257 It is, of course, impossible to know with any degree
of certainty what recidivism rates among this group of high-risk offenders might have been without the monitoring. The economic impact
of innovations is something to be considered, but should be evaluated
against the backdrop of the overwhelming societal costs.
C. Impact of State-Based Solutions
The potential impact of individual state-based solutions has
been criticized by some scholars and may not appear to have great
252. MICH. HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EARLY
LEASE TERMINATION, S.B. 185 (2010), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents
/2009-2010/billanalysis/House/pdf/2009-HLA-0185-3.pdf.
253. See supra Table 1.
254. Kovner, supra note 229.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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significance because of their relative isolation and novelty.258 To be
sure, when one takes a closer look at two recent legislative innovations discussed in this paper in tandem, for example housing laws
and electronic monitoring provisions, there is overlap in only four of
the states.259 That is, only four states and the District of Columbia
have enacted both kinds of legislation. Ideally, states would create
a myriad of legislative and policy provisions to provide victims with
the broadest array of options as they maneuver through the process
of dealing with violence perpetrated against them and the related
issues that invariably arise.
Scholars like Judith Resnik, whose work reconceptualizes notions of federalism, offer a somewhat optimistic lens through which
to view the various ways in which domestic violence policy can proliferate.260 Specifically, she examines the way in which all levels of
government interact and intersect: horizontally, vertically, and diagonally.261 She writes:
[T]he relevant public-sector based participants in policy debates
extend beyond the three branches of the national government
and the states, acting alone or coordinated through Congress.
Translocal organizations like the National League of Cities, the
U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the collectives of state attorneys
general, governors, and state legislators are all exemplary of the
multiplication of “national” players, rooted in states and localities yet reaching across them. . . . [T]hat multiplicity is part of
the federalism vision, which seeks solace in the knowledge that
competition about ideas and responses exists at the national level
and enlivens debates about the shape of regulation.262
258. See Hafemeister, supra note 16, at 944 (“Because most legislative action on IPV
in recent years has occurred at the state level, where differences readily propagate, these
divergent views have resulted in a patchwork of laws and policies aimed at addressing
IPV, with little uniformity in the employed approaches.”). Many are still reeling from the
decision in Morrison, in which the Court overturned a federal civil rights remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, a provision created in the first place to address the
widespread inconsistencies and limitations among states. Id. at 933–34.
259. Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, and Utah are the only four states that have
passed both permissive electronic monitoring provisions and have an anti-discrimination
housing law or early lease termination law. See supra Table 1; see also supra Table 2. No
states have passed all 3 laws. See supra Table 1; see also supra Table 2.
260. See, e.g., Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 709, 766 (2008) (explaining the virtues of federalism in achieving political objectives).
261. Judith Resnik, What’s Federalism For?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 269, 271
(Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Resnik et al., supra note 260, at 763.
262. Resnik et al., supra note 260, at 784–85. In this article Resnik and her co-authors
apply their framework to the issue of climate change, focusing specifically on how the failure of the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change does not mean an end to the
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Resnik is persuasive in her argument that we need not be limited by a narrow vision of what laws have the capacity to create farreaching impact.263 Federal laws certainly can function to universalize
rights for victims. Desiring such universalization, however, does not
require a universal or “one size fits all” approach to domestic violence.
Rather, it allows for a broad, widely available array of options that
victims can avail themselves of. Decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court, as was the case with United States v. Morrison,264 even though
effectively limiting federally based rights, can still inspire states to
act.265 In reaction to the Court’s decision in Morrison, in fact, some
states passed laws extending a private tort cause of action to victims
of gender-based violence, reacting to the majority’s holding which
effectively denied victims of gender-based violence a federal private
cause of action, and reinforced the idea that such legal tools should
be left to the states to legislate.266 To Resnik’s point, states themselves
frequently look vertically, and diagonally, across their borders, in their
lawmaking.267 As a result, a state-based movement, even in the absence of federal legislation, and under a regime of existing Supreme
Court holdings that severely restrict protections for victims, does not
necessarily lack the power to change domestic violence policy on a
broader scale.268 “States and localities have been and are important

proliferation of climate change policy. Id. at 765. Although the issue of domestic violence
is substantively distinct from climate change, Resnik’s framework is nonetheless useful.
263. Resnik, supra note 261, at 269. States look not just in the traditional vertical
orientation, but horizontally and diagonally as well. Resnik uses the example of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
as a point of illustration. Resnik et al., supra note 260, at 722. Although the United States
has failed to ratify CEDAW, several cities across the United States have adopted aspects
of it as local law. Resnik, supra note 261, at 275. Resnik sees the adoption of CEDAW
measures by these cities, such as San Francisco, as more than just something done at
the whim of progressives. Id. “Rather, San Francisco’s provisions are the outgrowth of
a social movement that has formed around CEDAW.” Id.
264. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
265. Julie Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women
Act: Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165 (2005) (explaining that after
the Supreme Court struck down the federal civil rights remedy for victims of violence,
many states responded by passing their own state-based laws (referred to sometimes as
mini-VAWA laws) that would extend similar rights to victims). “Although the civil rights
remedy no longer is available, new initiatives pick up on the aspirations that underlay
the civil rights remedy’s enactment and chart new courses for advancing women’s equality rights and helping those who have survived domestic violence and sexual assault move
to safety and independence.” Id. at 180.
266. Id. at 165.
267. Resnik, supra note 261, at 271.
268. See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 965, 965 (2005); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000).
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sites of social change.” 269 An innovation, then, in domestic violence
law reform in one state, has increasing potential to influence lawmaking in another.
The desire for more states to implement similar statutes providing for victim protections does not call for the “one size fits all” criminal law response to be replaced with a “one size fits all” civil law
response. Indeed, the goal of identifying a myriad of victims’ needs
invites the passage of an array of laws that will ultimately provide
a multiplicity of choices to which victims may avail themselves, and
which will ultimately compliment the existing response.
Finally, it is important to note how the reach of legislation goes
far beyond the obvious mandate of specific state actions and the resulting protections. The process of creating new laws and their resulting impact can also have a profound effect on public opinion,
make more people aware of the problem in the first place, help cultivate an understanding of the complex dynamics of domestic violence,
and send a societal message that domestic violence is something to
be taken most seriously. Regardless of one’s stance on the effectiveness of mandatory arrest, for example, as a result of the widespread
passage of these laws there are unintended consequences, perhaps
the most significant of which is that the general public is at least now
more aware of the prevalence of domestic violence.270
CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD
Domestic violence remains a problem of epidemic proportions
in the United States. Significant progress has been made in shifting
attitudes, laws, and policies away from a historic tradition of nonresponse and non-intervention. Today, most actors in the legal system and individuals in the broader community have an appreciation
of the problem and its far-reaching effects and have crafted remedies that largely involve intervention by the criminal justice system.
Scholars remain divided about the effectiveness and desirability of
the criminal law response.
The next phase of the domestic violence movement ought to
resist the tendency to essentialize the experience of victims and
269. Resnik, supra note 261, at 274 (encouraging a rethinking of the federalist “narrative that assumes that national leadership alone has produced the rereading of the
Constitution to embrace rights-holding by women and men of all colors”).
270. SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 199. Professor Schneider emphasizes that
“[l]awmaking can be a form of public education that shapes public perceptions and social
attitudes; education can open new ways of seeing the world that can spark and shape
new ways of thinking about law.” Id.
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instead recognize that their needs vary widely. The criminal law
response plays an important role in the movement, but does not inherently meet the needs of all victims, or all of a particular victim’s
needs. Legislative and policy innovations, like those concerning housing issues and the safety of victims, illustrate one way of complementing the traditional criminal law approach to domestic violence,
and underscores the importance of lawmakers working together
with social workers, psychologists, researchers, lawyers, victims, and
others to craft effective responses. These actors should continue
their efforts to create a broad policy agenda that includes the creation of far-reaching laws and policies outside the criminal law that
provide victims with more choices and options that are responsive
to their varying needs, and depart from the problematic “one size fits
all” model.

